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I. INTRODUCTION
Growth management has been an issue throughout the United
States at least since the 1960s following the publication of Freidman's
famous critique of low-density suburban expansion of urban areas into
the surrounding rural countryside, The Costs of Sprawl.' Truth be
told, although such "sprawl" had been taking place with the advent of
the residential covenanted subdivision in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century the relative unaffordability of the single-family de-
tached home on a comfortably-sized lot kept the "problem" to a mini-
mum until the birth of the boom in such suburban expansion follow-
ing World War 11.2 Soon, periodicals and journals of every stripe be-
came filled with articles decrying and excoriating the costs of sprawl
in terms of lost agricultural land and other open space and public fa-
cilities necessary to accommodate such growth.
1. REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., THE COSTS OF SPRAWL (1974).
2. See, e.g., HOwARD P. CHUDACOFF & JUDrTH E. SMrrH, THE EVOLUTION OF
AMERICAN URBAN SOcIETY (6th ed., 2004).
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In particular, government at every level struggled to provide
adequate infrastructure-roads, water, sewer, schools, and parks-to
accommodate the seemingly voracious demands of such rapid
Greenfield development. While it had for decades been relatively
common practice to require a subdivider to provide internal improve-
ments as a condition for subdivision plat approval, 3 the ad valorem
real property tax, even coupled with a share of state sales and income
tax and federal block grants, proved inadequate for local govern-
ment-on whom the responsibility fell-to cope with such public facil-
ity needs. As a result, local government turned to an expansion of de-
veloper-funded public facility provisions by means of required exac-
tions, dedications and fees (impact and in-lieu), and land development
conditions. These provisions were all sought to shoulder the major
share of costs for such infrastructure or public facilities, primarily on
the ground that it was the land developer which generated the need
for such facilities in the first place.
Many states formalized this relationship through a variety of
state statutes.4 A variety of studies and proposed remedies for
the issues surrounding growth management coalesced in the "smart
growth" movement,5 eventually adopted by the American Planning
Association as the centerpiece of a comprehensive study followed by
suggested legislation and ordinances designed to blunt the effect of
growth's more deleterious effects. 6 Key to this effort and others re-
mains the provision of adequate infrastructure to support such
growth. Land development conditions have been and remain a critical
part of the solution to growth, smart or otherwise. In a series of cases,
the U.S. Supreme Court and appellate courts around the country have
identified criteria for imposing such conditions and raised several is-
sues that local government must address in passing the problem of
3. ROBERT H. FREILICH & MICHAEL M. SHULTZ, MODEL SUBDIVISION
REGULATIONS: PLANNING AND LAW: A COMPLETE ORDINANCE AND ANNOTATED GUIDE TO
PLANNING PRACTICE AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS (2d ed. 1995).
4. See, e.g., infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
5. "Smart Growth" is defined by the American Planning Association (APA) as
"a collection of planning, regulatory, and development practices that use land resources
more efficiently through compact building forms, infill development, and moderation in
street and parking standards." See Stuart Meck, Bringing Smart Growth to Your Com-
munity, THE COMMISSIONER, Summer 2000, available at,
http://www.planning.org/thecommissioner/summerO0.htm. The APA firther states that
"[o]ne of its purposes is to reduce the outward spread of urbanization, protect sensitive
lands, and, in the process, create true neighborhoods with a sense of community." Id.
6. See, eg., GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES FOR
PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE (Stuart Meck ed., 2002); Stuart Meck, Pre-
sent at the Creation: A Personal Account of the APA Growing Smart Project, LAND USE L.
& ZONING DIG., Mar. 2002, at 3, 3-11; Meck, supra note 5.
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funding such infrastructure to the land developer whose development
drives the need for such infrastructure in the first place.
II. LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS
A. Introduction
Land development of any size and substance requires a variety of
public facilities to support it. Most common is the need for additional
roads, public utilities, parks, and schools. To this list, one could logi-
cally add police and fire stations, as well as sanitary landfills. The
time is long past since government, particularly local government, has
borne the principal burden of the costs of these facilities. State and lo-
cal financial resources have been woefully inadequate at least since
the end of massive federal subsidies in the early 1980s. For decades,
local government has charged land developers with part of the cost for
such public facilities, at least with respect to those facilities intrinsic
to the development, in the form of subdivision dedications and
fees. Initially "charged" as the price of drawing and recording the
simpler and cheaper subdivision plat in place of the lengthy, tedious,
and easily-flawed metes and bounds description for land development,
these fees and dedications soon became part of the regulatory land use
process, exercised by local government under the police power for the
health, safety, and welfare of the people, often as a method to control
or manage growth.7
7. See ROBERT H. FREimICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL
LEGAL, PLANNING, AND ENvIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS (2000); JULIAN CONRAD
JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
REGULATION LAW (2d ed. 2003); EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING
LAND-USE DEvELOPMENT AND FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DOLAN ERA (Robert H.
Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995); DAvID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LAND USE 148 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LAND USE]; FREILICH & SHULTZ, supra note 3, at 1-6; DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE
LAW (4th ed. 1997); Susan P. Schoettle & David G. Richardson, Nontraditional Uses of the
Utility Concept to Fund Public Facilities, 25 URB. LAw. 519, 519-22 (1993); Frona M.
Powell, Challenging Authority for Municipal Subdivision Exactions: The Ultra Vires At-
tack, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 635, 635-36 (1990); Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Robert Ma-
son Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Government's Capital Funding Dilemma, 9
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415 (1981); Thomas M. Pavelko, Subdivision Exactions: A Review of
Judicial Standards, 25 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 269 (1983); DEVELOPMENT
EXACTIONS (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987).
The British also continue to experiment with land development conditions. See, e.g.,
Tom Cornford, Planning Gain and the Government's New Proposals on Planning Obliga-
tions, 2002 J. PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 796; David L. Callies & Malcolm Grant, Paying for
Growth and Planning Gain: An Anglo-American Comparison of Development Conditions,
Impact Fees and Development Agreements, 23 URB. LAw. 221 (1991).
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However, by justifying such land development dedications and
fees as police power regulations rather than "voluntary" costs of using
the subdivision process, local governments invite judicial scrutiny un-
der the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion, which permits the taking of private property for public use only
upon payment of just compensation.8 While early cases, by and large,
upheld such intrinsic dedications and fees, the more recent charges of
"impact fees" for the shared construction by several land develop-
ments of large and expensive public facilities (such as municipal
wastewater treatment plants and sanitary landfills), outside or ex-
trinsic to the development upon which the fee is levied, led knowl-
edgeable courts to scrutinize the connection between these fees and
the need generated by the charged development for the particular fa-
cility in question.9 Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the law
applicable to impact fees, exactions, and in lieu fees, as well as to
compulsory dedications, is the same, given that they all represent
land development conditions levied at some point in the land devel-
opment process, such as subdivision plat approval, shoreline man-
agement permit, building permit, occupancy permit, or utility connec-
tion.10 Therefore, except where the test specifically makes such dis-
tinctions, the terms are used interchangeably.
The major legal issue with respect to fees, dedications, and exac-
tions, is the connection or "nexus" to the land development. Without
this connection or "nexus," such land development regulations are
generally unconstitutional takings of property without compensation,
particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission," and Dolan v. City of Tigard.12 Therefore,
much of part II is devoted to these cases and their progeny.
Critical as the takings/nexus issue is, there are additional legal
requirements for attaching conditions to the development of
land. Among these are the need for authority to levy such dedications,
fees, and other exactions, in the form of enabling legislation and local
ordinances, to avoid the charge that they are "ad hoc," and the need to
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. Ira Michael Heyman & Thomas K, Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Impos-
ing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exac-
tions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964); see also John D. Johnston, Jr., Constitutionality of Subdi-
vision Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 871 (1967).
10. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bainbridge, Inc., 929 P.2d 691, 698-99 (Colo.
1996); see also DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS, supra note 7, at 3-4.
11. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
12. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). For recent commentary, see J. David Breemer, The Evo-
lution of the "Essential Nexus" Test: How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan
and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373 (2002).
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expend the fee, whether "in lieu" of a dedication requirement or an
impact fee, within a reasonable period of time after collection. As the
history and cases have made abundantly clear, such land development
conditions are development driven; that is, to be valid, they must be
collected (and exactions and dedications required) for, and only for,
public facilities and infrastructure for which land development causes
a need. 13 Courts uniformly strike down-usually as an unauthorized
tax-land development conditions that are not so con-
nected. Generally, this includes attempts to remedy existing infra-
structure deficiencies, 14 or to provide for operation and maintenance
of facilities. 15
Of course, if payment for a public facility, or its construction or
dedication, is in part fulfillment of a landowner's contractual obliga-
tions under a development agreement between landowner and local
government, then the legal issues and analysis are entirely different;
consequently, the need for nexus and proportionality, at least as a
matter of constitutional law, disappears. 16
B. Nexus, Proportionality, and Takings
A land use regulation or action must not be so unduly restrictive
that it causes a "taking" of a landowner's property without just com-
pensation. 17 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in
part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."18
13. James C. Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and Inci-
dence, L. & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1987, at 85; JAMES C. NICHOLAS, ARTHUR C. NELSON
& JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, A PRACTIONER'S GUIDE TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT
FEES 37-38 (1991); TAKINGs: LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS
AFTERDOLAN AND LUCAS (David L. Callies ed., 1996).
14. Marblehead v. City of San Clemente, 277 Cal. Rptr. 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
("[The] defect affects the entire measure [and] the initiative's severance clause c[ould not]
be used to save any part of it").
15. Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 311 (Colo. 1989) ("[The transfer
provision in section 108A-13 c[ouldl be effectively severed from the remainder of the ordi-
nance, and, when so severed, the remaining parts of the ordinance c[ould] be imple-
mented in accordance with the stated legislative purpose of 'providing maintenance and
upkeep of the city's local streets and related facilities.') (citation omitted).
16. Callies & Grant, supra note 7, at 239-50.
17. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962).
18. See also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. For an excellent overview of both federal
and California takings law, see Justice Mosk's majority opinions in Landgate, Inc. v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm'n, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841 (Cal. 1998), and in Santa Monica Beach, Ltd.
v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93 (Cal. 1999). See also Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147
F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998); TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSPEC-
TIVES (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002).
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1. Federal Constitutional Standard
While much of the recent case law dealing with such conditions
and exactions has developed from challenges to the impact fee, the
language is applicable to all three. To be enforceable and valid, an im-
pact fee must be levied upon a development to pay for public facilities,
the need for which is generated, at least in part, by that develop-
ment. 19 This so-called "rational nexus" test, developed by the courts in
Florida and other jurisdictions, considers such fees and exac-
tions. 20 First proposed in 1964,21 it became the national standard by
the end of the 1970s.22
The test essentially has two parts. First, the particular develop-
ment must generate a need to which the amount of the exaction bears
some rough proportionate relationship. Second, the local government
must demonstrate that the fees levied will actually be used for the
purpose stated.23
This test was confirmed and made applicable to all land devel-
opment conditions by a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
1987. Decided on the last day of the Court's 1987 term, Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission deals ostensibly with beach ac-
cess.24 There, property owners sought a coastal development permit
from the California Coastal Commission to tear down a beach house
and build a bigger one. The Commission granted the permit only upon
condition that the owner give the general public the right to walk
across the owner's backyard beach area, an easement over one-third of
the lot's total area. The purpose, the Commission said, was to pre-
19. David L. Callies, Impact Fees, Exactions and Paying for Growth in Hawaii,
11 U. Haw. L. Rev. 295 (1989) (report review) [hereinafter Callies, Impact Fees]; Brian W.
Blaesser & Christine M. Kentopp, Impact Fees: The "Second Generation," 38 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 55 (1990); CALLIEs ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE, supra
note 7, ch. 4.
20. See, e.g., Hernando County v. Budget Inns of Fla., Inc., 555 So. 2d 1319 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Frisella v. Town of Farmington, 550 A.2d 102 (N.H. 1988); Baltica
Constr. Co. v. Planning Bd. of Franklin Twp., 537 A.2d 319 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1988);
Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 387 S.E.2d 655 (N.C. 1990); Unlimited v. Kitsap County,
750 P.2d 651 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
21. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 9; see also Fred P. Bosselman & Nancy
Stroud, Legal Aspects of Development Exactions, in DEvELOPMENT EXACTIONS 70 (James
E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987) [hereinafter Bosselman & Stroud, Legal As-
pects].
22. See Bosselman & Stroud, Legal Aspects, supra note 21, at 74.
23. Fred P. Bosselman & Nancy E. Stroud, Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of
Land Development Linkage, 9 NOVA. L.J. 381, 397-99 (1985) [hereinafter Bosselman &
Stroud, Mandatory Tithes]; see also Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d
277 (N.J. 1990).
24. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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serve visual access to the water, which was impaired by the much big-
ger beach house. The Court, however, held that, assuming the com-
mission's purpose to overcome the psychological barrier to the beach
created by overdevelopment was a valid one, it could not accept that
there was any nexus between these interests and the public lateral ac-
cess or easement condition attached to the permit.
25
However, the Court said, it is an altogether different matter if
there is an "essential nexus" between the condition and what the
landowner proposes to do with the property.26
There are several important factors for local governments to con-
sider in levying impact fees:
1. The fees must generally be charged as part of the land
development process, not the land reclassification or rezoning
process. Fees are development driven, and land reclassifica-
tion, while it may well be a prelude to development, does not
create any need for public facilities whatsoever. 27
2. Collected fees do not belong in the general fund, or once
again the need becomes questionable.
3. The fees cannot be kept by government for years and
years, for the same reason stated in number 2 above.
Ignoring the foregoing raises a presumption as a matter of both
law and policy that the impact fee is nothing more than a revenue-
raising device, either for a facility that has nothing to do with the land
development upon which the fee is raised, or for undetermined fiscal
purposes generally. In either case, the "fee" is then presumed to be a
tax. This characterization as a tax is almost always fatal to an impact
fee, since most local governments have very little specific authority to
tax beyond the property tax and, occasionally, a sales or income
25. Id. at 838-39. For a full discussion, see Callies & Grant, supra note 7.
26. 483 U.S. at 836-37; see also Bosselman & Stroud, Mandatory Tithes, supra
note 23; Callies, Impact Fees, supra note 19; Brenda Valla, Linkage: The Next Stop in De-
veloping Exactions, 2 Growth Management Studies Newsletter 4 (June 1987); Jerold S.
Kayden & Robert Pollard, Linkage Ordinances and Traditional Exactions Analysis: The
Connection Between Office Development and Housing, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1987, at 127; Rachelle Alterman, Evaluating Linkage and Beyond: Letting the Windfall
Capture Genie Out of the Bottle, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1988); CALLIES ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE, supra note 7. But see Holmdel Builders Ass'n,
583 A.2d 277 (upholding impact fees for housing as functional equivalents of mandatory
set-asides, which the court had already approved under New Jersey's constitutionally
based "fair share" doctrine).
27. Although such fees are charged in California when land is rezoned to a
planned unit development, a special zone in most jurisdictions, it often carries with it de-
velopmental rights.
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tax. Since an impact fee is none of the above, and since all local gov-
ernment taxes must be supported by specific statutory authority, the
fee is almost always declared illegal. 28
The Nollan Court did not discuss the required degree of connec-
tion between the exaction imposed and the projected impacts of the
proposed development. This issue was left open until the U.S. Su-
preme Court's 1994 decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard.29 In this
landmark 5-4 decision, the Court held for the first time that a city
must demonstrate a relationship between the conditions imposed on a
development permit and the development's impact. 30
Florence Dolan owned a plumbing business and electrical supply
store located in the business district of Tigard, Oregon, along Fanno
Creek, which flowed through the "southwestern corner of the lot and
along its western boundary."31 Dolan applied to the city for a building
permit to double the size of the store and pave the 39-space parking
lot. To mitigate the effects of increased runoff from her property that
would result from her expansion plans, the city planning commission
required that Dolan dedicate to the city the portion of her property ly-
ing within the 100-year flood plain along Fanno Creek for a public
greenway. To reduce the impact of increased traffic and congestion
caused by an increase in visitors to her store, the commission also re-
quired that Dolan dedicate an additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent
to the flood plain as a public pedestrian/bicycle pathway.32
In Dolan, the Supreme Court added a second test beyond
"nexus": whether the degree or amount of the exactions demanded by
the city's permit conditions were sufficiently related to the projected
impact of the development proposed. The Court coined the term
"rough proportionality" to describe the required relationship between
the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed
development. 33 The Court then stated "[n]o precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
28. See, e.g., Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982); Home Builders Ass'n of
Central Arizona, Inc. v. Riddel, 510 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1973); Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra
note 7.
29. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
30. Id. at 390-91.
31. Id. at 378.
32. Id. at 379-80.
33. Id. at 391. After coining the term "rough proportionality," the Court, in its
majority opinion, never used that term again when it applied its decision to the facts; in-
stead, it continued to use the words "required reasonable relationship" or "reasonably re-
lated." Id. at 394-95. Notably, the Court rejected stricter standards as the constitutional
norm. Id. at 389-90; see also Herron v. Mayor & City Council of Annapolis, 388 F. Supp.
2d 565, 570-71 (D. Md. 2005).
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is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized deter-
mination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development."
34
The Court reviewed the exactions (the required dedications of the
public greenway and the pedestrian/bicycle pathway) and found that
the city had not met its burden of demonstrating the required propor-
tionality.
Together, Nollan and Dolan35 require that to pass constitutional
muster, land development conditions imposed by government
1. Must seek to promote a legitimate state interest;
2. Must be related to the land development project upon
which they are being levied by means of a rational or essential
nexus;
3. Must be proportional to the need or problem which the
land development project is expected to cause, and the project
must accordingly benefit from the condition imposed.
Under the first standard, legitimate state interest, an agency
may only require a landowner to dedicate land (or interests in land) or
contribute money for public projects and purposes, such as public fa-
cilities, and in most jurisdictions, public housing.36
Under the second standard, essential nexus, an agency must find
a close connection between the need or problem generated by the pro-
posed development and the land or other exaction or fee required from
the landowner/developer. Thus, for example, a residential develop-
ment will in all probability generate a need for public schools and
parks. A shopping center or hotel in all probability will not. Both will
generate additional traffic and therefore generate a need for more
streets and roads.
Under the third standard, proportionality, a residential develop-
ment of, say, three hundred units may well generate a need for addi-
tional classroom space, but almost certainly not a new school or school
34. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
35. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the applicability of Nollan
and Dolan despite invalidating the "substantially advances" formula of identifying regula-
tory takings that was drawn upon in the Court's analysis in the Nollan decision. See
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545-48 (2005).
36. Although Lingle v. Chevron did away with the "substantially advances a le-
gitimate state interest test" in traditional Filth Amendment regulatory taking cases,
there is little evidence it meant to do so in "unconstitutional conditions like Nollan and
Dolan. For a full discussion, see D. Callies & C. Goodin, J. MARSHALL L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2007), and R.S. Radford, Just a Flesh Wound? The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron on
Regulatory Takings Law, 38 URB. LAW. 437 (2006).
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site. On the other hand, such a residential development of several
thousand units would, when constructed, likely generate a need for a
new school and school site, depending upon the demographics of the
new residents.
2. Applicability of Nollan and Dolan to Land Development Conditions
Generally
A number of courts have struck down land development condi-
tions for failure to comply with Nollan's and Dolan's three-part
test. An excellent example is the Eighth Circuit's decision in Christo-
pher Lake Development Co. v. St. Louis County,3 7 in which the court
applied Dolan to strike down a county drainage system require-
ment.38 The county granted the owner of forty-two acres preliminary
development approval for two residential communities on the condi-
tion that the owner provide a drainage system for an entire water-
shed. Citing Nollan for the nexus test, the court opined that
"[a]lthough the County's objective to prevent flooding may be rational,
it may not be rational to single out the Partnership to provide the en-
tire drainage system."39 The court then found such a requirement dis-
proportionate to the drainage problems resulting from the proposed
development:
[FIrom our review of the record, the County has forced the
Partnership to bear a burden that should fairly have been al-
located throughout the entire watershed area. "A strong public
desire to improve the public condition will not warrant achiev-
ing the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change."40
Concerning the remedy, the court said, "[wie believe that the
Partnership is entitled to recoup the portion of its expenditures in ex-
cess of its pro rata share and remand to the district court to determine
the details and amounts."41
An even more egregious case is Walz v. Town of Smith-
town.42 There, landowners were denied access to the public water sup-
ply when they refused to deed the front fifteen feet of their property to
37. 35 F.3d 1269 (8th Cir. 1994).
38. Id. at 1274-75.
39. Id. at 1274.
40. Id. at 1275 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994)).
41. Id.
42. 46 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Smithtown for road-widening purposes.4 3 Finding a total lack of nexus
between water service and road widening, the court found that "[a]s
landowners, the Walzes surely had a right not to be compelled to con-
vey some of their land in order to obtain utility service.""
Lack of proportionality between the exaction and the problem it
is meant to solve is the basis for other courts to nullify exactions. In
Steel v. Cape Corp., a Maryland appellate court held unconstitutional
the board's denial of a developer's rezoning application based on the
inadequacy of school facilities in the community. 45 The court cited Do-
lan and Nollan: "While the provision of public facilities is a legitimate
concern of the County, the burden of providing adequate schools is
disproportionately placed upon Cape Corporation when residential
use is denied to them while being granted to its neighbors."" Simi-
larly, in Burton v. Clark County,47 the Court of Appeals of Washington
court of appeals held that while a road dedication requirement for a
three-lot subdivision met the nexus test, there was no evidence to sus-
tain a finding of rough proportionality. 48 As the court noted: "[T]he
government may not use the permitting process as a vehicle for solv-
ing public problems not created or exacerbated by any project."49
Substantially further afield is the application of Dolan in Mano-
cherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital,50 in which the New York Court of Ap-
peals struck down a rent stabilization statute in part because it did
not advance "a closely and legitimately connected State inter-
est."51 Citing both the Dolan and Nollan cases, the court said that "the
Supreme Court refrained from placing any limitations or distinctions
or classifications on the application of the 'essential nexus' test."52
In Homebuilders Ass'n of Dayton and the Miami Valley v. City of
Beavercreek,53 the court adopted a nexus and proportionality standard
to examine the validity of a road impact fee ordinance. Specifically,
the city had to "demonstrate that there [was] a reasonable relation-
ship between the city's interest in constructing new roadways and the
43. Id. at 164-65.
44. Id. at 169; see also Art Piculell Group v. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227,
1233 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); Nielsen v. Merriam, No. 40106-8-I, 1998 WL 390442, at *2
(Wash. Ct. App. July 13, 1998) (holding that there was no nexus between a county-
required easement and any problems created by a proposed subdivision).
45. 677 A.2d 634 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
46. Id. at 650.
47. 958 P.2d 343 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
48. Id. at 356-57.
49. Id. at 354 n.42 (emphasis in original).
50. 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994).
51. Id. at 480.
52. Id. at 483 (citation omitted) (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 834 (1987)).
53. 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000).
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increase in traffic generated by new developments." If a reasonable re-
lationship was found to exist, it had to then demonstrate "that there
[was] a reasonable relationship between the impact fee imposed by
Beavercreek and the benefits accruing to the developer from the con-
struction of new roadways." 54 The ordinance passed this test and was
upheld.55
In Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd., the town con-
ditioned its approval of the development of a residential subdivision
on the developer's rebuilding an abutting road.56 The court initially
noted that "conditioning government approval of a development of
property on some exaction [was] a compensable taking unless the con-
dition (1) [bore] an essential nexus to the substantial advancement of
some legitimate government interest and (2) [was] roughly propor-
tional to the projected impact of the proposed development." 57 The
Texas Supreme Court opined that the "[t]own. .. failed to relate dis-
counted traffic impact fees to the impact of developments on traffic." 58
"[C]onditioning development on rebuilding [a] [r]oad with concrete
and making other changes was simply a way for the [t]own to extract
from [the developer] a benefit to which the town was not enti-
tled.... The exaction.., was [declared] a taking for which [the devel-
oper was] entitled to compensation." 59
In Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas,60 the
court struck down a thirty percent open-space dedication requirement
on a fifty-one lot subdivision approval, while upholding a road dedica-
tion requirement for emergency vehicles in absence of evidence con-
cerning the cost of the road and its effects on the subject property. 61 In
Reynolds v. Inland Wetlands Commission of Trumbull, 2 the court
struck down a requirement that the landowner grant a conservation
easement over three of his lots as a condition of developing a fourth
lot, in part on the ground that such a condition would not pass a
"nexus" test.63 In Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg," the court
struck down a road widening dedication, holding that the taking of
twenty percent of Amoco's land for roadway widening purposes on the
54. Id. at 356.
55. Id. at 356-58.
56. 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004).
57. Id. at 634.
58. Id. at 644.
59. Id. at 645.
60. 990 P.2d 429 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
61. Id.
62. No. 309721, 1996 WL 383363 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 1996).
63. Id. at *2.
64. 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
IDAHO LAW REVIEW
basis of a .4 percent increase in traffic caused by the proposed devel-
opment "does not correspond with the slightest notions of rough pro-
portionality."65
In St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n,6 6 the
court held that a fee of $448 per single-family dwelling met the ra-
tional nexus test when applied to a 100-unit subdivision but failed a
proportionality standard because it was not clear that the money col-
lected would necessarily benefit those who paid the fee.6 7 In Volusia
County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P.,68 the same court held that
a school impact fee as applied to a retirement community failed the
rational nexus test because the community was subject to covenants
prohibiting minors from residing there.6 9 In Everett School District
No. 2 v. Mastro,70 the Court of Appeals of Washington upheld a school
impact mitigation fee based on the average number of students in 869
apartments in twenty-five buildings as a condition for the issuance of
a building permit for an apartment complex.7 1 The court noted with
approval that the fee calculation provided for no impact from "studio
apartments and [was] based on the exact number of one and two bed-
room apartments in the complex."7 2
Of course, exactions and dedications may well be proper, assum-
ing they meet the nexus and proportionality tests, if they are attached
to land development permits of some kind. There are literally dozens
of pre-Nollan /Dolan cases upholding various impact fees and exac-
tions for roads, sewers, water, and housing where at least the nexus
standard later imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have
65. Id. at 391; see also Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App.
1994) (striking down a road dedication); Timber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n of Sherman, No. 272170, 1992 WL 239100 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 1992)
(striking down a road dedication); Prop. Group, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n of Tolland, 628
A.2d 1277 (Conn. 1993) (striking down a road widening dedication); Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Gov't v. Schneider, 849 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (striking down
bridge dedication requirement); Cobb v. Snohomish County, 829 P.2d 169 (Wash. Ct. App.
1991) (striking down a road improvement fee); Dellinger v. City of Charlotte, 441 S.E.2d
626 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (striking down a road dedication requirement); Castle Homes &
Dev. v. City of Brier, 882 P.2d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (striking down a per-lot road
impact fee); McClure v. City of Springfield, 28 P.3d 1222, 1227 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (invali-
dating a sidewalks and "clipped comers" exaction in the absence of specific findings ex-
plaining how these exactions were "relevant or proportional" to the city's interest in safe
streets at the location of the proposed development).
66. 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991).
67. Id. at 639.
68. 760 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2000).
69. Id. at 136.
70. No. 42835-7-I, 1999 WL 674782 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1999).
71. Id. at *6.
72. Id.
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been met. For a comprehensive list of such cases, see City of Annapo-
lis v. Waterman.73
3. Impact Fees
What if a city or other local agency requires payment of an im-
pact fee or imposes some other sort of development condition not re-
quiring the dedication of land? Does the Nollan/Dolan nexus test ap-
ply? Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground 4 adds to the grow-
ing consensus that the so-called "heightened scrutiny" applicable to
dedications also applies to monetary fees and exactions. There, a de-
veloper successfully challenged a city condition of subdivision plat ap-
proval requiring half-street improvements to a street adjoining, but
extrinsic, to the proposed development, "based upon the length of the
development adjoining the street."75 "[Tihe subdivision did not directly
access the street" subject to the improvements. 76 The court held that
such a condition met neither the essential nexus test nor the require-
ment of rough proportionality, and so was an unconstitutional land
development condition.77
A year later, the Washington Court of Appeals reconsidered the
case following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in City of Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.78 In that case, the Court said
that it had never applied the "heightened scrutiny" standard from
Nollan/Dolan beyond a land dedication.7 9 Nevertheless, the Washing-
ton Court of Appeals found that the Dolan rough proportionality test
still applied; because the city required the developer to pay for some-
thing outside the relevant property to address a problem not caused
by the new development, the condition was invalid.8 0 "Surely if the is-
sues for an exaction of money are the same as for an exaction of land,
73. 745 A.2d 1000, 1009 (Md. 2000) (listing types of conditions that have been
upheld as constitutional, although the decision itself is badly flawed and demonstrates a
misunderstanding of takings and exactions law).
74. 972 P.2d 944 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
75. Id. at 949.
76. Id. at 946.
77. Id. at 950-51.
78. Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 14 P.3d 172, 173 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2000) (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999)).
79. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 703.
80. Id.
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the test must be the same: a showing of 'nexus' and 'proportional-
ity."81
Applying a different and stricter test, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Illinois held that a street improvement fee vio-
lated the State's constitution because it was not specifically "attribut-
able to the new development" for which it was charged.8 2 In that case,
two developers paid fees, under protest, for timely final plat re-
cordings of their subdivision plats. The court found that Bolingbrook
did not meet its burden of showing that the impact fees for the cost of
future or recent improvements of existing or proposed streets were
significantly attributable to the specific developments.8 3
The California Supreme Court answered this question differently
in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City.84 The Ehrlich court held that if a city
bases a development or impact fee on an ordinance or rule of general
applicability, the fee will be within the city's police power and will not
be subject to the heightened constitutional scrutiny of the Nol-
lan /Dolan nexus test. However, if an impact fee is adjudicatively im-
posed on an individual property owner, it will be subject to heightened
scrutiny under the Nollan /Dolan test.
Following the Ehrlich decision, the Texas Supreme Court in
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd.,85 agreed that at least
the Dolan test for proportionality should apply to both dedicatory and
non-dedicatory exactions. There the court stated:
We agree with the Supreme Court of California's decision in
Ehrlich. For purposes of determining whether an exaction as a
condition of government approval of development is a com-
pensable taking, we see no important distinction between a
dedication of property to the public and a requirement that
property already owned by the public be improved. The Dolan
standard should apply to both.86
81. Benchmark, 14 P.3d at 175. For commentary agreeing that the Del Monte
Dunes decision does not foreclose heightened scrutiny to fees and exactions beyond dedi-
cation of land, see Bruce W. Bringardner, Exactions, Impact Fees and Dedications: Na-
tional and Texas Law After Dolan and Del Monte Dunes, 32 URB. LAw. 561 (2000).
82. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Vill. of Bolingbrook, No. 97-C-7055, 1999 WL 65054,
at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 1999) (internal punctuation omitted), vacated, No. 97-C-7055, 1999
WL 259952 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 1999).
83. Id. at* 10.
84. 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996). The Supreme Court of California recently reaf-
firmed the Ehrlich approach in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco,
41 P.3d 87, 104 (Cal. 2002).
85. 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004).
86. Id. at 639-40.
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Other courts, on the other hand, have specifically applied Nol-
lan/Dollan beyond dedications to monetary exactions. For example,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Garneau v. City of Seattle,87
held that the Nollan/Dollan doctrine could be applied to non-physical
dedications; however the doctrine was found inapplicable in that spe-
cific case for other reasons.88 While noting that the case before it was
not appropriate for setting out precise rules, an Oregon appellate
court held in Clark v. City of Albany,89 that "the fact that Dolan itself
involved conditions that required a dedication of property interests
does not mean that it applies only to conditions of that kind."90
4. Legislative Decisions
In its broadest context, as noted by Justice Thomas in his dissent
from a denial of a petition for certiorari in Parking Ass'n of Georgia,
Inc. v. City of Atlanta,91 "[tihe lower courts are in conflict over
whether Dolan's test for property regulation should be applied in
cases where the alleged taking occurs through an Act of the legisla-
ture."92 After citing, inter alia, Trimen Development Co. v. King
County93 and Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital,94 Justice Thomas
observed the following:
It is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the
type of governmental entity responsible for the taking. A city
council can take property just as well as a planning commis-
sion can. Moreover, the general applicability of the ordinance
should not be relevant in a takings analysis.... The distinc-
tion between sweeping legislative takings and particularized
administrative takings appears to be a distinction without a
constitutional difference. 95
However, many courts have ruled to the contrary, and have not
applied the Dolan test to legislative decisions. In Home Builders Ass'n
of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale,96 the Arizona Supreme Court
87. 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998).
88. Id. at 809-11.
89. 904 P.2d 185 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
90. Id. at 189 (emphasis in original).
91. 515 U.S. 1116(1995).
92. Id. at 1117 (Thomas, J., & O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiora-
rai).
93. 877 P.2d 187 (Wash. 1994).
94. 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994).
95. Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc., 515 U.S. at 1117-18.
96. 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997).
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specifically refused to apply any heightened scrutiny to Scottsdale's
water resource development fee, deciding that Nollan /Dolan was in-
applicable to generally legislative fees of this type.97 In Texas Manu-
factured Housing Ass'n v. City of Nederland, the Fifth Circuit also de-
clined to apply such scrutiny to a challenge to a general zoning ordi-
nance prohibiting trailer coaches on any lot in the city except trailer
parks.98
Other cases are less easy to explain and more clearly follow the
Arizona court in City of Scottsdale.99 In Arcadia Development Corp. v.
City of Bloomington,100 the Court of Appeals of Minnesota refused to
apply Nollan /Dolan to a requirement that "mobile home park owners
who close their parks ... pay relocation costs to park residents,"101 on
the ground that as a city-wide ordinance, a legitimate government in-
terest test, rather than a rough proportionality test, applied. 102 Like-
wise, in Spinell Homes, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage,103 the Su-
preme Court of Alaska declined to apply Nollan/Dolan to predeter-
mined municipal subdivision dedication requirements that applied
city-wide, as a condition to granting building permits.104
While not nearly so definite, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine "assign[ed] weight to the fact that the easement requirement
derives from a legislative rule of general applicability and not an ad
hoc determination" in Curtis v. Town of South Thomaston.105 It never-
theless did apply a rough proportionality test in determining the fee
was a valid exercise of the police power.106 Therefore, the use of an
impact fee statute coupled with an ordinance may increase considera-
bly the likelihood that a court will apply less than the heightened se-
curity, which Nollan /Dolan require. Hawaii has such a statute.10 7 On
97. Id. at 999-1000; see also GST Tucson Lightwave, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 949
P.2d 971, 978 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (deciding that Nollan/Dolan was inapplicable to a
"franchise or license issued by a municipality to use public rights-of-way").
98. 101 F.3d 1095, 1105 (5th Cir. 1996).
99. In some jurisdictions, subdivision exactions found in a generally applicable
subdivision statute have been held to fall outside Nollan/Dolan. See Marshall v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 912 F. Supp. 1456, 1471-74 (D. Wyo. 1996); see also Home Builders
Ass'n of Dayton v. City of Beavercreak, Nos. 94-CV-0012, 94-CV-0062, 1996 WL 812607,
at **17-18 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Feb. 12, 1996) (citing City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993); Harris v.
City of Wichita, 862 F. Supp. 287, 294 (D. Kan. 1994 ) ("Dolan's rough proportionality test
does not apply to this case."); Wonders v. Pima County, 89 P.3d 810 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
100. 552 N.W.2d 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
101. Id. at 283.
102. Id. at 283, 286.
103. 78 P.3d 692 (Alaska 2003).
104. Id. at 702.
105. 1998 ME 63, 7, 708 A.2d 657, 660 (Me. 1998).
106. Id.
107. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-142 (LexisNexis 2003).
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the other hand, in B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County,108
the Supreme Court of Utah held that the Nollan /Dolan rule applied
specifically pursuant to a state statute.10 9
Some courts share the puzzlement of Justice Thomas as to why
the legislative character of the land development condition should af-
fect whether it is an unconstitutional land development condi-
tion. Citing Justice Thomas's certiorari petition dissent in Parking
Ass'n of Georgia, an Illinois appellate court disagreed that a munici-
pality could "skirt its obligation to pay compensation.., merely by
having the Village Board of trustees pass an 'ordinance' rather than
having a planning commission issue a permit."110 Oregon appellate
courts have consistently applied Nollan/Dolan to legislative and
quasi-judicial exactions alike, whether required by a zoning ordinance
or not. Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court stated in passing that,
While we recognize that an ad hoc decision is more likely to
constitute a taking than general legislation, we think it en-
tirely possible that the government could "gang up" on par-
ticular groups to force extractions that a majority of constitu-
ents would not only tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens
they would otherwise bear were shifted to others."'
5. Level of Detail Required for Showing Nexus and Proportionality
In Home Builders Ass'n of Northern California v. City of Napa,
plaintiffs claimed that a generally applicable inclusionary housing or-
dinance, which offered developers a number of alternative modes of
compliance and allowed a waiver under certain circumstances, ef-
fected a taking under Nollan and Dolan.112 The court disagreed, hold-
ing that such a generally applicable ordinance did not warrant the
heightened standard of review accorded to the type of individualized
land use bargain that creates a "heightened risk of 'extortionate' use
of the police power to exact unconstitutional" exactions. 113
108. 2006 UT 2, 128 P.3d 1161 (Utah 2006).
109. Id. at 39-44, 128 P.3d at 1170-71.
110. Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 389-90 (I. App. Ct.
1995); cf. Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821 (N.Y. 2003) (applying
Nollan and Dolan to a fixed subdivision in lieu fee).
111. Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. lship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 641
(Tex. 2004).
112. 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 65 (Ct. App. 2001).
113. Id. at 65-66 (quoting Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d
993 (Cal. 1999)).
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6. When Must the Findings of Nexus and Proportionality be Made?
In both Nollan and Dolan, the administrative findings regarding
the relationship between the public purpose served and the condition
exacted were made long before either case went to court.11 4 In Ham-
mer v. City of Eugene, however, the city did not make findings when it
conditionally approved applications to partition land.115 Those ap-
provals were subject to certain physical exactions. 1" 6 The Court of Ap-
peals of Oregon held that the city could make the required individual-
ized showing of rough proportionality at trial. 117 The court reasoned
that the administrative procedures in both Nollan and Dolan were
merely incidental and that the Court in those cases thus did not in-
tend to require prior findings. The court also explained that the issue
of when findings are entered is not an issue properly brought under
the Takings Clause. 118 Instead, the Court observed, that issue is more
properly the subject of a due process inquiry.1' 9
Likewise, in B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, the
county sought to exercise its police power to require the developer to
dedicate additional property for the purpose of widening a road adja-
cent to the developer's proposed subdivision. 20 The developer argued
that the exaction was an unconstitutional taking and that the Dolan
rough proportionality test should have been applied because the
"dedication and improvement" was not "reasonably justified by the ac-
tual impact [of] the proposed development." 121 The county board and
district court both rejected this argument and the developer ap-
pealed. 22 Before the Utah Supreme Court rendered its decision, the
Utah state legislature codified the Nollan/Dolan test into its statute
on county exactions. 1 3 The statute, however, did not retroactively ap-
ply to this case. In its opinion, the court noted that it had "yet to lend
its voice to the unruly judicial chorus on this issue"124 and would not
"choose whether to adopt or apply the legislative/adjudicative model
based solely on our judgment concerning which side of the debate has
114. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987); Dolan v. City of Ti-
gard, 512 U.S. 374, 379-82 (1994).
115. 121 P.3d 693 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
116. Id. at 698.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 697.
119. Id.
120. 2006 UT 2, 4, 128 P.3d 1164 (Utah 2006) ("Salt Lake County ordinance
15.28.010 requires developers of land to dedicate property... [for] streets.").
121. Id. at 7, 128 P.3d at 1164.
122. Id. at % 7, 128 P.3d at 1164-65.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 45, 128 P.3d at 1171.
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the more persuasive case. This is because our legislature has spoken
directly to the question."1 25 Stating that the court had taken "no posi-
tion" on the question in the past and that "we are hard pressed to find
a reason to assume that the legislative view of. .. [the] test would
have been different before" and would not "upend any reasonable ex-
pectation on the part of a governmental entity," the Utah Supreme
Court remanded the case and ordered the trial court to conduct a
rough proportionality review of the exaction. 126
7. Cost and Calculation of Fees
Impact fees are imposed by local governments for a variety of
public facilities, including without limitation, roadway improvements,
water and sewer facilities, solid waste disposal, parks, schools, librar-
ies, and police and fire stations. These fees are typically imposed as
part of the subdivision or development approval process and are
common provisions in both development and annexation agree-
ments. According to various studies, these fees can be extensive add-
ing considerably to the cost of the development upon which they are
levied. 127 For example, according to one California agency publication,
in 1999, California home builders paid fees averaging $24,325 for each
single family home constructed, with fees ranging from $11,176 to a
high of $59,703.128 When impact fees are added to other development
costs such as building permit and zoning and planning application
fees, the cost of development above and beyond acquisition and con-
struction costs can be staggering, as shown in the following survey of
residential development fees in selected suburban communities in
California. 29
Typically, local governments adopt ordinances to set the rate or
schedule for these fees. Most ordinances adopt one of two methods in
calculating impact fees. The first method is a fixed fee based on a unit
of development. For example, Palm Beach, Florida's road impact fee
ordinance has established a set fee of $300 per single family home,
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. JAMES C. NIcHoLAs & DAN DAvIDSON, IMPACT FEES IN HAWAii:
IMPLEMENTING THE STATE LAw 9 (1992).
128. Div. OF Hous. POLICY DEV., CAL. DEP'T OF Hous. AND CMTY. DEv., PAY TO
PLAY: RESIDENTIAL DEvELOPMENT FEES IN CALIFORNIA CITIES AND COUNTIES, 1999 at 103
(2001), available at http'//www.hcd.Ca.gov/hpd/pay2play/fee-rpt.pdf.
129. Id. at 61; see also Sandy Beach Def. Fund v. City Council of Honolulu, 773
P.2d 250 (Haw. 1989).
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$200 per multiple family home, and $175 per mobile home. 130 The sec-
ond adopts a variable formula based on the need for the facilities or
improvements generated by the new development. 131 Although the
fixed fee method is much simpler to adopt and apply, the formula
method more accurately reflects the proportionate costs of public fa-
cilities attributable to specific types of new development. 132 This is
particularly important in light of the Dolan decision. Some communi-
ties have adopted an alternative method of calculating the appropri-
ate fee. Under this alternative method, the municipality in essence al-
lows the developer to set its own fee by demonstrating that its share is
less than the fee set by ordinance through the submission of inde-
pendent studies and economic data.133
An impact fee ordinance should relate the impact fee that is
charged to the developer to the needs generated by the new develop-
ment. Calculation of the fees should be tied to a study, report, or plan
based on an analysis of the new development's impact. 34 For example,
most water and sewer impact fees are based on the amount of flowage
required by a certain type of development, sometimes measured in
P.E.'s or "Population Equivalents."
Courts have generally upheld fees based on average flow (for
sewer) or usage (for water) or impact (for many other facilities or im-
provements). For example, the court in Amherst Builders Ass'n v. City
of Amherst, 35 upheld the City's impact fee schedule that calculated
sewage impact fees based on the average sewage flow for various
types of structures, as estimated by the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency. 3 6 The City had responded to charges that the connection
fee of $400 was invalid by introducing evidence that the "capital cost"
of each connection averaged $1,186. The court found that the sewage
impact fee was reasonable and proportionate to the sewage flow an-
ticipated by the new development. 37
130. Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. Bd. of
County Conm'rs of Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140, 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
131. NIcHoLAs, NELSON & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 13, at 37-38.
132. David L. Callies, Exactions, Impact Fees and Other Land Use Development
Conditions, in ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS ch. 9 (E. Kelly ed., 1997).
133. Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach, 446 So. 2d at 145.
134. Id.; see also F&W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1994) (upholding traffic impact fee ordinance that was adopted only after a
comprehensive study of edsting road facilities, current zoning, projected population
growth, and existing commercial uses).
135. 402 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1980).
136. Id. at 1182.
137. Id. at 1184; see also Contractors & Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City
of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 318 (Fla. 1976) (upholding water and sewer connection fees
that were less than the costs the city would incur in accommodating new uses of its water
and sewer systems).
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With respect to park and school impact fees, the calculation of
the fees should insure that the fee is reasonably proportionate to the
cost of providing the additional park or school facilities attributable to
the new development. 138 Just what those fees may be used for depends
upon the enabling statute or ordinance. Thus, for example, an Illinois
court recently interpreted a school impact fee statute so that school
impact fees may only be used to acquire land for school sites (and not
to fund existing school expenses). 139 An Ohio court struck down park
impact fees that were collected and used for the operation and main-
tenance of existing recreational facilities because the City failed to
show the nexus between the proposed development and the use of fees
for existing park facilities. 140 In some communities, the local govern-
mental entity adopts an impact fee ordinance to impose park and
school fees, then enters into an agreement with the impacted district
(that is., the school or park district) to set out the procedures for col-
lecting and remitting these fees.' 4 '
Impact fees should also be calculated to address the impact the
new development is expected to have on nearby facilities. For exam-
ple, the Illinois statute authorizing the imposition of road impact fees
provides that the fee shall not "exceed the development's proportion-
ate share of the cost of such road improvements" that are specifically
and uniquely attributable to the new development.142 In applying this
standard, DuPage County Illinois' road impact fee ordinance estab-
lished a "standard fee [table for residential, commercial, and other
types of development based on] the cost of road construction and the
number of motor vehicle trips generated by different types of land
use[s]."143 The county calculated the fees using formulas that traced
cars as they left particular developments and entered the roads. ' The
court upheld the fee, finding that the county's fees were calculated in
such a way to be specifically and uniquely attributable to the impact
138. See, e.g., Wellington River Hollow, LLC v. King County, 54 P.3d 213, 219-20
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
139. Thompson v. Vill. of Newark, 768 N.E.2d 856 (11. App. Ct. 2002).
140. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Cleveland & Suburban Counties v. City of Westlake,
660 N.E.2d 501, 505 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding park impact fee unreasonable as it re-
quired only new construction developers to shoulder the burden of funding existing park
facilities).
141. See, e.g., VILLAGE OF NORTHBROOK, ILL., SUBDIVISION & DEv. CODE § 4-
101G14.
142. 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-605 (2006).
143. N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 621 N.E.2d 1012,
1017 (IlM. App. Ct. 1993).
144. Id. at 1020.
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of the new development. 145 Further studies included the creation of a
computer model to determine future travel patterns.
Similarly, a Florida court upheld a road impact fee ordinance in-
tended to pay the cost of road construction necessitated by new devel-
opment, finding that the formula for calculating the fee was reason-
able.146 Calculation of the applicable road impact fee was based on the
"costs of road construction and the number of motor vehicle trips gen-
erated by [various] land uses."147 "[The ordinance provides for a] fee of
$300 per unit for single family homes, $200 per unit for multi[ple]
family [developments], $175 per unit for mobile homes with other
amounts for commercial [and] other [types ofi development." 148 The
court noted that the formula for calculating the fee was flexible and
allowed the developer to furnish its own data to demonstrate that its
share was less than the ordinance formula amount.149
8. Statutory Systems
Several states have attempted to bring order to the land devel-
opment condition process by enacting comprehensive statutes to deal
with many of the issues raised by the case law described in the pre-
ceding section. One of the most comprehensive comes from Hawaii,
which authorizes its four counties to exact or levy impact fees,1 50 pro-
vided they first engage in a needs assessment study.' 5' A needs as-
sessment study "determines the need for a public facility, the cost of
development, and the level of service standards, and that projects fu-
ture public facility capital improvement needs; provided that the
study shall take into consideration and incorporate any relevant
county general plan, development plan, or community plan." 52 "The
study [must) be prepared by an engineer, architect, or other qualified
professional and... identify service standard levels, project public fa-
cility capital improvement needs, and differentiate between existing
and future needs."153 The amount and type of impact fee to be charged
145. Id.
146. Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. Board of
County Commissioners of Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140, 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
147. Id. at 142.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-142 (LexisNexis 2003).
151. Id. § 46-141. "Assessment of impact fees shall be a condition precedent to the
issuance of a grading or building permit and shall be collected in full before or upon issu-
ance of the permit." Id. § 46-146. For comment on impact fee statute and its use and goals
in Hawaii, see NIcHoLAS & DAvIDSON, supra note 127.
152. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-141.
153. Id. § 46-143(a).
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to the developer is determined once the needs assessment study is
complete.
The statute codifies the Nollan/Dolan test to establish how an
impact fee is calculated. "An impact fee [must] be substantially re-
lated to the needs arising from the development and shall not exceed
a proportionate share of the costs incurred or to be incurred in ac-
commodating the development." 154
[S]even factors [that must] be considered in determining a
proportionate share of public facility capital improvement
costs:
(1) The level of public facility capital improvements re-
quired to appropriately serve a development...;
(2) The availability of other funding for public facility
capital improvements... ;
(3) The cost of existing public facility capital improve-
ments;
(4) The methods by which existing public facility capital
improvements were financed;
(5) The extent... [the] developer.., has contributed in
the previous five years to the cost of existing public facility
capital improvements and received no reasonable benefit... ,
and any credits that may be due to a development because of
such contributions;
(6) The extent to which a developer required to pay im-
pact fees over the next twenty years may reasonably be an-
ticipated to contribute to the cost of existing public facility
capital improvements through user fees, debt service pay-
ments, or other payments, and any credits that may accrue to
a development because of future payments; and
(7) The extent to which a developer is required to pay im-
pact fees as a condition precedent to the development of non-
site related public facility capital improvements, and any off-
154. Id. § 46-143(d).
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sets payable to a developer because of this provision.155
Likewise, "[tihe pro rata amount of each impact fee [must] be
based on the development and actual capital cost of public facility ex-
pansion, or a reasonable estimate thereof.. .. "156
"[Impact fees [caninot be collected from a developer until...
[the] needs assessment study [is approved]."157 Once approved, the
fees that are collected must "be deposited in a special trust fund or in-
terest-bearing account."158 A county must spend the fees if it will pro-
vide a localized benefit to the development; for example, a county may
establish a geographically limited benefit zone where the fees must be
expended. 159 Moreover, "[ilmpact fees [can only] be expended for pub-
lic facilities of the type for which they are collected and of reasonable
benefit to the development."160 If none of this is done "[wlithin six
years of the date of collection," 16 1 the county must "refund to the de-
veloper or the developer's successor in title the amount of fees paid
and any accrued interest."16 2
Florida also has a statutory system for providing adequate public
facilities for new developments. Their system is known as "concur-
rency." Florida's concurrency requirement for developments applies to
the following public facilities that are affected by development:
"[s]anitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, potable water, parks and rec-
reation, schools, and transportation facilities, including mass tran-
sit."1683 The concurrency requirement requires the following from new
developments:
Water.
[Slanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, adequate water sup-
155. Id. § 46-143(d).
'Public facility capital improvement costs' means costs of land acquisition,
construction, planning and engineering, administration, and legal and finan-
cial consulting fees associated with construction, expansion, or improvement
of a public facility. Public facility capital improvement costs do not include
expenditures for required affordable housing, routine and periodic mainte-
nance, personnel, training, or other operating costs.
Id. § 46-141.
156. Id. § 46-143(c).
157. Id. § 46-144(3).
158. Id. § 46-144(1).
159. Id. § 46-144(2). "A county or board shall explain in writing and disclose at a
public hearing reasons for establishing or not establishing benefit zones." Id.
160. Id. § 46-144(4).
161. Id. § 46-144(5).
162. Id. § 46-145(a).
163. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3180(1)(a) (West 2006).
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plies and potable water facilities [must] be in place and avail-
able to serve [the] new development no later than the issuance
by the local government of [the] certificate of occu-
pancy .... [In addition, before a building permit is issued,]
the local government [must] consult with the applicable water
supplier to determine whether adequate water supplies to
serve the new development will be available no later than the
anticipated date of issuance ... of the certificate of occu-
pancy .... A local government may meet the concurrency re-
quirement for sanitary sewer through the use of onsite sewage
treatment and disposal systems approved by the [State] De-
partment of Health to serve the new development.164
Parks and Recreation.
[Facilities for parks and recreation intended] to serve new de-
velopment [must] be in place or under actual construction no
later than [one] year after [the local government has issued] a
certificate of occupancy .... However, the acreage of such fa-
cilities [must] be dedicated or be acquired by the local gov-
ernment prior to issuance ... of [the] certificate of occu-
pancy..., or funds in the amount of the developer's fair share
shall be committed no later than the local government's ap-
proval to commence construction. 165
Transportation facilities.
"[Transportation facilities needed to serve new development
[must] be in place or under actual construction [no later than three]
years after the local government approve[d] a building permit... that
results in traffic generation."166 According to the statute, "[the con-
currency requirement as implemented in local comprehensive plans
does not apply to public transit facilities."1 7
164. Id. § 163.3180(2)(a).
165. Id. § 163.3180(2)(b).
166. Id. § 163.3180(2)(c).
167. Id. § 163.3180(4)(b).
[This] include[s] transit stations and terminals, transit station parking, park-
and-ride lots, intermodal public transit connection or transfer facilities, and
fixed bus, guideway, and rail stations. (However] ... the terms "terminals"
and "transit facilities" do not include airports or seaports or commercial or




"School concurrency [must] be established on a districtwide basis
and [must] include all public schools in the district .... [While t]he
application of school concurrency to development [is] based on the [lo-
cal government's] adopted comprehensive plan,"168 the statute pro-
vides for minimum requirements. These requirements include: a pub-
lic school facilities element,169 level-of-service standards,7 0 designa-
tion of a service area,'7 ' the financial feasibility of the public school fa-
cilities,17 2 and the owner and "the developer executes a legally binding
commitment to provide mitigation proportionate to the demand for
public school facilities to be created by actual development of the
property . -173
Any other "public facility or service cannot be made subject to
concurrency on a statewide basis without appropriate study and ap-
proval by the Florida State Legislature. [Despite this limitation for
the State], a 'local government may extend' the concurrency require-
ment so that it applies to additional public facilities within its juris-
diction."'174
The statute does provide for some flexibility in applying concur-
rency to new development. "The concurrency requirement, except as it
relates to transportation facilities 175 and public schools,... may be
waived by a local government for urban infill and redevelopment ar-
eas ... if [the] waiver does not endanger public health or safety as de-
fined by the local government in its local government comprehensive
plan." 76 An urban infill and redevelopment area is
an area or areas designated by a local government where:
a) Public services such as water and wastewater, transporta-
tion, schools, and recreation are already available or are
scheduled to be provided in an adopted [five]-year schedule of
capital improvements;
168. See id. § 163.3180(13).
169. See id. § 163.3180(13)(a).
170. See id. § 163.3180(13)(b).
171. See id. § 163.3180(13)(c).
172. See id. § 163.3180(13Xd).
173. Id. § 163.3180(13)(e)(1). "Appropriate mitigation options include the contri-
bution of land; the construction, expansion, or payment for land acquisition or construc-
tion of a public school facility; or the creation of mitigation banking based on the construc-
tion of a public school facility in exchange for the right to sell capacity credits." Id.
174. Id. § 163.3180(1)(a).
175. The statute provides for an entire section on transportation facility excep-
tions from the concurrency requirement. See id. § 163.3180(5).
176. Id. § 163.3180(4)(c).
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b) The area, or one or more neighborhoods within the area,
suffers from pervasive poverty, unemployment, and general
distress... ;
c) The area exhibits a proportion of properties that are sub-
standard, overcrowded, dilapidated, vacant or abandoned, or
functionally obsolete which is higher than the average for the
local government;
d) More than [fifty] percent of the area is within 1/4 mile of a
transit stop, or a sufficient number of such transit stops will
be made available concurrent with the designation; and
e) The area includes or is adjacent to community redevelop-
ment areas, brownfields, enterprise zones, or Main Street pro-
grams, or has been designated by the state or Federal Gov-
ernment as an urban redevelopment, revitalization, or infill
area under empowerment zone, enterprise community, or
brownfield showcase community programs or similar pro-
grams. 77
The same standard for urban infill and redevelopment areas is
used when a local government grants an exception for transportation
facilities to a new development:
A local government may grant an exception from the concur-
rency requirement for transportation facilities if the proposed
development is otherwise consistent with the adopted local
government comprehensive plan and is a project that pro-
motes public transportation or is located within an area des-
ignated in the comprehensive plan for: (1) Urban infill devel-
opment; (2) Urban redevelopment; (3) Downtown revitaliza-
tion; or (4) Urban infill and redevelopment .... 178
Even with the exception, "a local government [must] adopt into
the plan and implement strategies to support and fund mobility
within the designated exception area, including alternative modes of
transportation."17 9 The local government must consult with the De-
partment of Transportation to assess the impact that the proposed
177. Id. § 163.2514(2)(a)-(e).
178. Id. § 163.3180(5)(b).
179. Id. § 163.3180(5)(e).
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area is expected to have on state highways and roadways and develop
a plan to mitigate any such impacts.18 0
Of course, the legal and constitutional issues surrounding the
providing of infrastructure through land development conditions are
largely obviated should local government and landowner execute a
valid land development agreement.
III. DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
A. Why Development Agreements?
Both developers and local governments face difficult problems in
the land development approval process. Local governments are unable
to exact dedications of land or fees of the "impact" or "in-lieu" variety
without establishing a clear connection or nexus between the pro-
posed development and the dedication or fee.181 The developer is un-
able to "vest" or guarantee a right to proceed with a project until that
project is commenced. 182 The development agreement offers a solution
to both landowner/developer and local government. Often authorized
by statute to help avoid reserved power and Contract Clause prob-
lems, discussed below, a well-structured agreement can be drafted to
180. Id. § 163.3180(5)(f).
181. For more detailed treatment of this subject, see DAVID L. CALLIEs ET AL.,
BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK ON DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS,
ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS, LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDmIONs, VESTED RIGHTS, AND THE
PROVISION OF PUBLIc RIGHTS at art. Il, Development Agreements (2003) [hereinafter,
CALLIES ET AL., BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT]; D. Callies & J. Tappendorf, Unconstitu-
tional Land Development Conditions and the Development Agreement Solu-
tion: Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663
(2001); Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning,
Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use
Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 1017-20 (1987) (describing the "rational nexus" test adopted
by a majority of jurisdictions to assess the reasonableness of provisions requiring exac-
tions of property in development agreements and the expansion of the doctrine governing
exactions to address the use of "impact fees"); Lyle S. Hosoda, Development Agreement
Legislation in Hawaii: An Answer to the Vested Rights Uncertainty, 7 U. HAW. L. REV. 173
(1985); TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER
DOLAN AND LucAs chs. 4, 9, 10, 11 (David L. Callies ed., 1996).
182. See John J. Delaney, Vesting Verities and the Development Chronology: A
Gaping Disconnect?, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 603, 607-08 (2000) (noting that many states
require action such as construction or expenditure of funds in reliance on a development
permit for the permit to be valid).
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deal with a variety of common issues which arise in the land devel-
opment process between landowner and local government. 8 3
B. The Basic Problem: Bargaining Away the Police Power
and Reserved Power
The first issue arising in this type of land development process is
whether the local government has bargained away its police power by
entering into an agreement under which it promises not to change its
land use regulations during the life of the agreement. Specific statu-
tory authorization is helpful to make clear that these agreements ef-
fectuate a public purpose recognized by the state. To date, thirteen
states have adopted legislation enabling local governments to enter
into development agreements with landowner/developers. 184
1. "Freezing" and the "Contracting Away" Issue
It is black letter law that a local government may not contract
away its police power, 185 particularly in the context of zoning deci-
183. See generally DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: ANALYSES, COLORADO CASE
STUDIES COMMENTARY (Erin J. Johnson & Edward H. Ziegler eds., 1993); DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND PROSPECTS (Douglas R. Porter & Lindell L. Marsh
eds., 1989); DAvID J. LARSEN, DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT MANUAL: COLLABORATION IN
PURSUIT OF COMMUNITY INTERESTS (2002), available at http/www.cacities.org/ re-
sourcefiles120590 (select "FinalDevAgreement 4-5-02.pdf'). For commentary on the Brit-
ish experience with development agreements, see Callies & Grant, supra note 7. See
CALLIES ET AL., BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 181, for a checklist on draft-
ing agreements in Appendix XVI, and Appendices XI, XIV and XV for sample develop-
ment and annexation agreements.
184. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 9-500.05 (West Supp. 2006); CAL. Govr CODE
§ 65864 (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 278.0201-106 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 163.3220 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4780.22 (West 2002); NEV. REV. STAT.
Ann. § 278.0201 (LexisNexis 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-45.2 (West 1991); OR. REV.
STAT. § 94.504 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2303.1 (2003 & Supp. 2006) (applies only to
counties with a population between 10,300 and 11,000 and developments consisting of
more than 1000 acres); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B.170 (2004).
185. See Carlino v. Whitpain Investors, 453 A.2d 1385, 1388 (Pa. 1982)
("[Ilndividuals cannot, by contract, abridge police powers which protect the general wel-
fare and public interest").
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sions.186 Stated another way, it is impermissible for the government to
bind itself from exercising its police powers. It is thus considered to be
against public policy to permit the bargaining of zoning and subdivi-
sion regulations for agreements and stipulations on the part of devel-
opers to do or refrain from doing certain things. Because land use and
development regulations represent exercises of police power, a devel-
opment or annexation agreement binding a local government not to
exercise these regulatory powers arguably violates the reserved pow-
ers doctrine, 187 and is, therefore, ultra vires.
Under this doctrine, bargaining away the police power is the
equivalent of a current legislature attempting to exercise legislative
power reserved to later legislatures. 188 However, an analysis of the
relevant cases indicates that such agreements with long or permanent
terms, are what the courts generally inveigh against. The source of
the reserved powers doctrine, Corp. of the Brick Presbyterian Church
v. Mayor of New York, involved the municipal abrogation of a lease
executed over fifty years before.18 9 While a few later cases do involve
invalidation of municipal actions of more recent vintages," the majority
of cases on this issue deal with local government agreements dec-
186. See Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 291 N.E.2d 249, 251 (IlM. App. Ct. 1972)
(voiding a restrictive covenant and a rezoning ordinance because the law "condemns the
practice of regulating zoning through agreements or contracts between the zoning au-
thorities and property owners"); Houston Petroleum Co. v. Auto. Prods. Credit Ass'n, 87
A.2d 319, 322 (N.J. 1952) ("Contracts thus have no place in a zoning plan and a contract
between a municipality and a property owner should not enter into the enactment or en-
forcement of zoning regulations."); V. F. Zahodiakin Eng'g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 86 A.2d 127, 131 (N.J. 1952) ("Zoning is an exercise of the police power to serve the
common good and general welfare. It is elementary that the legislative function may not
be surrendered or curtailed by bargain or its exercise controlled by the considerations
which enter into the law of contracts.').
187. See, e.g., Robert M. Kessler, The Development Agreement and Its Use in Re-
solving Large Scale, Multi-Party Development Problems: A Look at the Tool and Sugges-
tions for Its Application, 1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451, 464-69 (1985) (discussing the re-
served pcwers doctrine and the inability of local governments to contract away police
powers); Bruce M. Kramer, Development Agreements: To What Extent Are They Enforce-
able?, 10 REAL EsT. L.J. 29, 37-45 (1981) (discussing the history and current viability of
the reserved powers doctrine in the context of development agreements).
188. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817-18 (1879) ("[N]o legislature can
curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as the may deem proper in matters
of police"); Corp. of the Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor of New York, 5 Cow. 538, 542
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) (noting that local governments have "no power to limit their legisla-
tive discretion by covenant"); Kramer, supra note 187, at 37-39 (discussing the doctrine of
reserved powers).
189. 5 Cow. 538.
190. See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89-90 (Fla. 1956) (affirming the
lower court's permanent injunction of a proposed revision of a zoning ordinance that had
not yet taken effect); V. F. Zahodiakin, 86 A.2d at 131-32 (affirming the lower court's in-
validation of a decision made earlier by the local board of adjustment that purported to
grant a "variance" from zoning requirements).
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ades old. The dominant view is that development agreements, drafted
to reserve some governmental control over the agreement, do not con-
tract away the police power, but rather constitute a valid present ex-
ercise of that power. Good analogous authority exists for this prem-
ise.191
A subsidiary question under the reserved powers doctrine is
whether a city council, in exercising its power to contract, can make a
contract that binds its successors. In Carruth v. City of Madera,192 the
City contended that obligations under an annexation agreement exe-
cuted by a predecessor council were invalid because they deprived the
successor city council of the power to "determine city policy" and act in
the public interest. 193 The court, however, held that the council of the
municipality executed a contract sufficient to bind the city, and that
the contract was fair, just, and reasonable at the time of its execu-
tion. 94 The court concluded that the contract was neither void nor
voidable merely because some of its executory features may operate to
bind a successor council.195
One of the clearest rejections of the application of the reserved
power doctrine comes from the broad Nebraska Supreme Court opin-
ion upholding development agreements in Giger v. City of
Omaha.196 Those challenging the agreement claimed that development
agreements were a form of contract zoning. 97 However, the Nebraska
Supreme Court preferred to characterize such agreements as a form
of conditional zoning that actually increased the city's police power,
rather than lessened it.19 The agreements permitted more restrictive
zoning (attaching conditions through agreement) than a simple
191. See, e.g., Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196,
202 (Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the effect of the general rule is "to void only a contract
which amounts to a city's 'surrender,' or 'abnegation' of its [c]ontrol of a properly munici-
pal function," and that the city's reservations of control over the land subject to an an-
nexation agreement, as well as the "just, reasonable, fair and equitable" nature of the
agreement, rendered the agreement valid and enforceable against the city).
192. 43 Cal. Rptr. 855 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
193. Id. at 860.
194. Id. at 860 n.190.
195. Id. at 860-61; see also Denio v. City of Huntington Beach, 140 P.2d 392, 397
(Cal. 1943) (holding that a "fair, just, and reasonable" contract entered into by a govern-
ing body of a municipality "is neither void nor voidable merely because some of its execu-
tory features may extend beyond the terms of office of the members of [the governing]
body"), overruled on other grounds by Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972).
196. 442 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 1989).
197. Id. at 189.
198. Id. at 190.
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Euclidean rezoning to a district in which a variety of uses would be
permitted of right. 199
Similarly, a recent California appeals court squarely upheld a
development agreement that was challenged directly on "surrender of
police power" grounds, holding that a "zoning freeze in the Agreement
is not... a surrender or abnegation [of the police power]."200 In Santa
Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County
("SMART),201 an area residents' association contended that because
San Luis Obispo County had entered into a development agreement
for a project before the project was ready for construction, thereby
freezing zoning for a five-year period, the county improperly con-
tracted away its zoning authority. In holding for the county, the court
noted that "[1]and use regulation is an established function of local
government," providing the authority for a local government "to enter
into contracts to carry out the function."22 The county's development
agreement: (1) required that the project be developed in accordance
with the county's general plan; (2) did not permit construction until
the county had approved detailed building plans; (3) retained the
county's discretionary authority in the future; and (4) allowed a zon-
ing freeze of limited duration only.20 3 The court found that the zoning
freeze in the county's development agreement was not a surrender of
the police power but instead "advance[d] the public interest by pre-
serving future options."20 4
In Stephens v. City of Vista, the Stephenses purchased property
in 1973 to develop an apartment complex of approximately 140 to 150
units.20 5 Subsequently, the City of Vista lowered the access street to
the property, frustrating the Stephenses' contemplated use, and
downzoned the property.20 6 The Stephenses sued. The city and the
199. Id. at 192. The court reasoned as follows:
In sum, we find that there is not clear and satisfactory evidence to support
the appellants' contention that the city has bargained away its police
power. The evidence clearly shows that the city's police powers are not
abridged in any manner and that the agreement is expressly subject to the
remedies available to the city under the Omaha Municipal Code. Further, we
find that the agreement actually enhances the city's regulatory control over
the development rather than limiting it.
Id.
200. Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County, 100
Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 748 (Ct. App. 2000).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 748.
203. Id. at 744.
204. Id. at 748.
205. 994 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1993)
206. Id. at 654.
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Stephenses eventually entered into a settlement agreement providing
for a specific plan and zoning that permitted construction of a maxi-
mum of 140 units.20 7 After rezoning the property, the city denied a site
development plan, in part because it wanted the Stephenses to reduce
the density. The Stephenses then renewed their lawsuit against the
city.208
The city argued that the settlement agreement unlawfully con-
tracted away its police power. The court disagreed. First, the court
noted that when the city entered into the settlement agreement, it
understood it was obligated to approve 140 units.209 Further, relying
on Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton,210 which upheld the
validity of an annexation agreement, the court held that while gener-
ally a local government cannot contract away its legislative and gov-
ernmental functions, this "rule applies to void only a contract which
amounts to a 'surrender'... of [the local government's] control of a
municipal function."211 Therefore, the city could contract for a guaran-
teed density and exercise its discretion in the site development proc-
ess without surrendering control of all of its land use authority. "The
court awarded $727,500 in damages [for breaching the agreement]
based on the difference between the value of the property with an en-
titlement of 140 units and the value of the property with a develop-
able density of 55 units" (the current zoning), which the appellate
court affirmed.212 Similarly, a development agreement that obligates a
local government to permit a certain density and type of development
should be enforceable by the developer.
In sum, the current application of the reserved powers clause to
abrogate government/private contracts has been rare and courts have
attempted to find other grounds to uphold those contracts which are
fair, just, reasonable, and advantageous to the local government.213 It
is unlikely that courts will fall back on the reserved powers clause to
invalidate development agreements passed pursuant to state statute,
207. Id. at 652.
208. Id. at 653.
209. Id. at 657.
210. 130 Cal. Rptr. 196 (Ct. App. 1976).
211. Stephens, 994 F.2d at 655 (emphasis in original).
212. Id. at 657.
213. See, e.g., Carruth v. City of Madera, 43 Cal. Rptr. 855, 860-61 (Ct. App.
1965) (holding contract entered into by the city can be enforced, even if it extends beyond
the legislative term, if the contract is fair, just, reasonable, and advantageous to the city);
see also Kramer, supra note 187, at 41 (discussing Carruth).
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especially if the agreements have a fixed termination date that is not
decades away.214
2. The Contracts Clause and Reserved Powers
It is also arguable that the United States Constitution provides
protection for development and annexation agreements in the face of
a reserved power challenge. The Contracts Clause states, "No State
shall.., pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts."215 Although statutorily defined as either a legislative or ad-
ministrative act, a development agreement will be treated as a con-
tract "when the language and circumstances evince a legislative in-
tent to create private rights of a contractual nature enforceable
against the State."216
Once the parties enter into a development agreement, strict ap-
plication of the Contracts Clause would prohibit the government from
passing any law or regulation that would subsequently impair the re-
sulting contractual obligations. Further, any such act would be uncon-
stitutional, notwithstanding the fact that the new regulation may be
required by a genuine health, safety, or welfare concern. Certainly
this result would not be tolerated, and therefore one must conclude
that if a development agreement, subject to the Contract Clause, ir-
revocably binds government to not exercise its police power in promo-
tion of the public interest, then the agreement violates the reserved
powers doctrine and is ultra vires.
The limitation of the Contract Clause is, however, neither literal
nor absolute. 21 7 The Supreme Court has held that the Contracts
Clause limitation cannot operate to eclipse or eliminate "'essential at-
tributes of sovereign power' necessarily reserved by the States to
safeguard the welfare of their citizens."218 The test in United States
Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, as refined in Allied Structural
214. See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-15.1-1 (West 1993) (restricting the
term of any annexation agreement to twenty years).
215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
216. U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 18 n.14 (1977). For a
full discussion, see Wegner, supra note 181, at 995-1003 (making the case that, although
writers have simply assumed that development agreements are contractual in nature, it
would be more correct to characterize development agreements as possessing a hybrid
contractual-regulatory nature).
217. See Eric Sigg, California's Development Agreement Statute, 15 SW. U. L.
REV. 695, 720-22 (1985) (discussing tension between the Contracts Clause and the "re-
served powers" doctrine, and describing various tests to determine whether a particular
contract "surrenders an essential attribute of [the state's] sovereignty"). Id. at 722 (quot-
ing U.S. Trust Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 23).
218. U.S. Trust Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 21 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934)).
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Steel Co. v. Spannaus,219 ultimately requires a balancing of the exer-
cise of the police power against the impairment resulting from the ex-
ercise of such police power. The decisions suggest that any exercise of
the police power that impairs any obligations under a development
agreement would be subject to strict scrutiny, and, therefore, must be
justifiable as an act "reasonable and necessary to serve an important
public purpose."220 Just what constitutes an "important public pur-
pose" sufficient to justify the impairment of contract obligations is a
factual determination. In United States Trust Co. of New York, the
court held that the bondholders' security interests outweighed the
state's interest in pollution control, rapid transit, and resource con-
servation. 221 Similarly, in Allied Structural Steel, the state's interest
in protecting its citizens' pensions failed to prevail over a private com-
pany's rights in its own pension plan. 222
C. Statutory Authority: Critical for Development
Agreements
Courts that condemn zoning by agreement inveigh against the
abridgment of powers protecting the general welfare and the "barter-
ing... [of] legislative discretion for emoluments that had no bearing
on the merits of the requested amendment."223 This makes statutory
authority important, if not critical. Indeed, an Iowa court held that a
219. 438 U.S. 234(1978).
220. U.S. Trust Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 25.
221. Id. at 28-31.
222. For a thorough discussion of the United States Trust Co. of New York-Allied
Structural Steel Co. test, see Anthony v. Kualoa Ranch, Inc., 736 P.2d 55 (Haw. 1987), in
which the Hawaii Supreme Court applied the Contracts Clause doctrine to strike down a
state statute requiring landlords to pay for leasehold improvements, at the tenant's op-
tion, as an unconstitutional impairment of contractual rights. See also Quality Refriger-
ated Servs., Inc. v. City of Spencer, 908 F. Supp. 1471 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (granting the
city's motion to dismiss, in part because plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under the
Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution and because it failed to show that city zoning or-
dinance substantially impaired a contractual relationship, or that legitimate government
interests would not justify such an impairment if it existed); Kramer, supra note 187, at
35 (concluding that "[s]ubsequent legislative action seeking to amend, modify, or repeal
[a] development agreement would undoubtedly impair the obligation of the contract and if
less onerous alternatives were available to the legislature to achieve the same policy goals
they would have to be taken"); Sigg, supra note 217, at 722 ("[Ift would appear that im-
pairment by a city or county of its own development agreement would have to survive the
heightened scrutiny of a 'reasonable and necessary to serve important state purposes'
test"). For an exhaustive discussion of the reserved powers doctrine and its applicability
to local government contracts (and its Contract Clause limitations), see Janice C. Griffith,
Local Government Contracts: Escaping from the Governmental /Proprietary Maze, 75
IOWA L. REV. 277 (1990).
223. Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 250 N.E.2d 791, 796 (11. App. Ct. 1969).
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city's promise to later widen a street and construct a sidewalk
amounted to an illegal contract to perform a governmental function in
the future.224 This it could not do without statutory authority. The
court opined that the same reasoning would also apply to the city's
exercise of its police power.
1. Protection of General Welfare
The first issue-protection of general welfare-is probably dis-
posed of by strong public purpose-serving language. California,225
Florida, 226 and Hawaii 227 all have such language in their development
agreement statutes.
224. See Marco Dev. Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1991)
(holding that the same limitation that prohibits a legislature from binding successive leg-
islative bodies applies to a legislature's grant to a city, through a home-rule amendment
to the state constitution, of "the power to contract for a the exercise of its governmental or
legislative authority").
225. The California Code provides:
The Legislature finds and declares that:
(a) The lack of certainty in the approval of development projects can result
in a waste of resources, escalate the cost of housing and other development to
the consumer, and discourage investment in and commitment to comprehen-
sive planning which would make maximum efficient utilization of resources
at the least economic cost to the public.
(b) Assurance to the applicant for a development project that upon approval
of the project, the applicant may proceed with the project in accordance with
existing policies, rules and regulations, and subject to conditions of approval,
will strengthen the public planning process, encourage private participation
in comprehensive planning, and reduce the economic costs of development.
(c) The lack of public facilities, including, but not limited to, streets, sewer-
age, transportation, drinking water, school, and utility facilities, is a serious
impediment to the development of new housing. Whenever possible, appli-
cants and local governments may include provisions in agreements whereby
applicants are reimbursed over time for financing public facilities.
CAL. Gov'r CODE § 65864 (West 1997).
226. The Florida code provides the following:
(2) The Legislature finds and declares that:
(a) The lack of certainty in the approval of development can result in a
waste of economic and land resources, discourage sound capital improvement
planning and financing, escalate the cost of housing and development, and
discourage commitment to comprehensive planning.
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(b) Assurance to a developer that upon receipt of his or her development
permit or brownfield designation he or she may proceed in accordance with
existing laws and policies, subject to the conditions of a development agree-
ment, strengthens the public planning process, encourages sound capital im-
provement planning and financing, assists in assuring there are adequate
capital facilities for the development, encourages private participation in
comprehensive planning, and reduces the economic costs of development.
(3) In conformity with, in furtherance of, and to implement the Local Gov-
ernment Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act
and the Florida State Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972, it is the intent of
the Legislature to encourage a stronger commitment to comprehensive and
capital facilities planning, ensure the provision of adequate public facilities
for development, encourage the efficient use of resources, and reduce the eco-
nomic cost of development.
(4) This intent is effected by authorizing local governments to enter into de-
velopment agreements with developers, subject to the procedures and re-
quirements of ss. 163.3220-163.3243.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3220 (West 2006).
227. The Hawaii code provides the following in the Findings and Purposes:
The legislature finds that with land use laws taking on refinements that
make the development of land complex, time consuming, and requiring ad-
vance financial commitments, the development approval process involves the
expenditure of considerable sums of money. Generally speaking, the larger
the project contemplated, the greater the expenses and the more time in-
volved in complying with the conditions precedent to filing for a building
permit.
The lack of certainty in the development approval process can result in a
waste of resources, escalate the cost of housing and other development to the
consumer, and discourage investment in and commitment to comprehensive
planning. Predictability would encourage maximum efficient utilization of re-
sources at the least economic cost to the public.
Public benefits derived from development agreements may include, but
are not limited to, affordable housing, design standards, and on- and off-site
infrastructure and other improvements. Such benefits may be negotiated for
in return for the vesting of development rights for a specific period.
Under appropriate circumstances, development agreements could
strengthen the public planning process, encourage private and public partici-
pation in the comprehensive planning process, reduce the economic cost of
development, allow for the orderly planning of public facilities and services
and the allocation of cost. As an administrative act, development agreements
will provide assurances to the applicant for a particular development project,
that upon approval of the project, the applicant may proceed with the project
in accordance with all applicable statutes, ordinances, resolutions, rules, and
policies in existence at the time the development agreement is executed and
that the project will not be restricted or prohibited by the county's subsequent
enactment or adoption of laws, ordinances, resolutions, rules, or policies.
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2. Requirements
As to the bartering away of unrelated (to land use) emoluments,
a well-drafted statute generally limits such agreements to specific
land use matters, with a catch-all for related matters. Florida's devel-
opment agreement statute contains such language.228 What the stat-
Development agreements will encourage the vesting of property rights
by protecting such rights from the effect of subsequently enacted county legis-
lation which may conflict with any term or provision of the development
agreement or in any way hinder, restrict, or prevent the development of the
project. Development agreements are intended to provide a reasonable cer-
tainty as to the lawful requirements that must be met in protecting vested
property rights, while maintaining the authority and duty of government to
enact and enforce laws which promote the public safety, health, and general
welfare of the citizens of our State. The purpose of this part is to provide a
means by which an individual may be assured at a specific point in time that
having met or having agreed to meet all of the terms and conditions of the
development agreement, the individual's rights to develop a property in a cer-
tain manner shall be vested.
HAW. REV. STAT. Ann. § 46-121 (LexisNexis 2003).
228. The Florida code provides the following:
(1) A development agreement shall include the following:
(a) A legal description of the land subject to the agreement, and the names
of its legal and equitable owners;
(b) The duration of the agreement;
(c) The development uses permitted on the land, including population den-
sities, and building intensities and height;
(d) A description of public facilities that will service the development, in-
cluding who shall provide such facilities; the date any new facilities, if
needed, will be constructed; and a schedule to assure public facilities are
available concurrent with the impacts of the development;
(e) A description of any reservation or dedication of land for public pur-
poses;
(f) A description of all local development permits approved or needed to be
approved for the development of the land;
(g) A finding that the development permitted or proposed is consistent with
the local government's comprehensive plan and land development regula-
tions;
(h) A description of any conditions, terms, restrictions, or other require-
ments determined to be necessary by the local government for the public
health, safety, or welfare of its citizens; and
[Vol. 43
2007] PROVIDING INFRASTRUCTURE FOR SMART 391
GROWTH: LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS
utes contemplate is the tradeoff of zoning for development-generated
public-infrastructure needs (whether or not, it should be added, such
public-infrastructure needs are generated by the instant develop-
ment). This is confirmed by cases upholding cooperative and annexation
agreements; 229 low-rent housing for zoning;2 30 annexation, zoning, and
sewer connections for annexation and annexation fees;231 and redevel-
opment agreements. 232
The Hawaii, Florida, Nevada, and California statutes contain
minimum standards for describing the basic character of a proposed
development subject to a development agreement.23 3 These include the
size and shape of buildings. In a decision that clearly signals the ex-
tent of flexibility possible in California, a California court of appeals
recently upheld a development agreement containing no such precise
(i) A statement indicating that the failure of the agreement to address a
particular permit, condition, term, or restriction shall not relieve the devel-
oper of the necessity of complying with the law governing said permitting re-
quirements, conditions, term, or restriction.
(2) A development agreement may provide that the entire development or
any phase thereof be commenced or completed within a specific period of
time.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3227.
229. See Hous. & Redev. Auth. for Lincoln County v. Jorgensen, 328 N.W.2d 740,
742-43 (Minn. 1983) (holding that the agreement between the city and the Housing and
Redevelopment Authority "required the city to issue the conditional use permits" for the
development of the "low-income public housing units").
230. See Hous. Auth. of L.A. v. City of Los Angeles, 243 P.2d 515, 524 (Cal. 1952)
(holding that the city was bound by the cooperative agreement with the housing authority
that approved development and construction of low-rent housing project).
231. See Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196, 201-03
(Ct. App. 1976) (holding that annexation agreements entered into between city and devel-
oper that required the city to provide sewage service to planned development were bind-
ing and enforceable against the city); Meegan v. Vill. of Tinley Park, 288 N.E.2d 423, 426
(Ill. 1972) (dismissing developer's mandamus action for issuance of a building permit to
build a gasoline station pursuant to annexation agreement within a reasonable time after
expiration of annexation agreement's statutory five-year period of validity).
232. See Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Crane, 352 A.2d 786, 791-92 (Md. 1976)
(holding that where a developer conveyed a strip of property to the city for highway pur-
poses under a zoning ordinance that allowed the developer's proposed development to
contain the same density of dwelling units as if the land had not been conveyed, the de-
veloper acquired vested contractual rights that were enforceable against the city).
233. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-126 (LexisNexis 2003): FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 163.3227; NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.0201 (LexisNexis 2005); CAL. Govr CODE
§ 65865.2 (West 1997).
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standards. 234 According to the court, it was sufficient that the zoning
ordinance governing the agreement contained height and size limita-
tions in the zone where the proposed project was to be constructed.235
This clearly indicates the importance of a well-drafted statute in
advancing the legality of the development agreement, particularly in
the face of a challenge on bargaining-away-of-police grounds
power. Indeed, there is only one significant case upholding a develop-
ment agreement against this and other challenges without the benefit
of such a statute. 236 It is therefore worth examining what other basic
provisions a typical development-agreement statute con-
tains. Thirteen states presently have such statutes.23 7 The most de-
tailed statute comes from Hawaii, and so the citations that follow are
primarily to that statute. However, California remains the state in
which the vast majority of development agreements appear to be ne-
gotiated and are in effect. 23 8
D. A Statutory Checklist
1. Enabling Ordinance
A preliminary issue is whether an enabling statute is sufficient
to grant local government the authority to enter into development
agreements. There is some authority for requiring a local government
to pass an enabling ordinance setting out the details of development
annexation agreement procedures and requirements, although this
requirement has so far been limited to development and/or agree-
ments rather than annexation agreements. Thus, the Hawaii239 and
234. See Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County,
100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 743 (Ct. App. 2000) (upholding development agreement that froze
zoning on the proposed development property in exchange for "the developer's commit-
ment to submit a specific plan for construction in compliance with County land use re-
quirements").
235. Id. at 747.
236. See Giger v. City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 1989).
237. See supra note 184.
238. Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Address at the Institute on Planning, Zoning and Emi-
nent Domain: Exactions, Dedications and Development Agreements Nationally and in
California: When and How Do the Dolan/Nollan Rules Apply (Apr. 10, 2003), available at
httpA/www.cacities.org/resourcefiles/23038.dan%20curtin%20exactions%20paper.pdf.
239. The Hawaii code provides:
General authorization.
Any county by ordinance may authorize the executive branch of the
county to enter into a development agreement with any person having a legal
or equitable interest in real property, for the development of such property in
accordance with this part; provided that such an ordinance shall:
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Florida 240 statutes appear to require that local governments desiring
to negotiate development agreements first pass a local resolution or
ordinance to that effect.
While the language of the Hawaii statute does not clearly require
such an ordinance, three out of Hawaii's four counties have drafted
them. According to attorneys in California, those California local gov-
ernments that have executed development agreements have also
passed such ordinances. Indeed, the recent amendments to the Cali-
fornia statute-by making it mandatory that local governments pass
such an ordinance at the request of landowners to ensure that there is
a process available for negotiating such agreements-appear to make
it very clear that such ordinances are a prerequisite.
(1) Establish procedures and requirements for the consideration of
development agreements upon application by or on behalf of persons having a
legal or equitable interest in the property, in accordance with this part;
(2) Designate a county executive agency to administer the agree-
ments after such agreements become effective.
(3) Include provisions to require the designated agency to conduct a
review of compliance with the terms and conditions of the development
agreement, on a periodic basis as established by the development agreement;
and
(4) Include provisions establishing reasonable time periods for the
review and appeal of modifications of the development agreement.
Negotiating development agreements.
The mayor or the designated agency appointed to administer develop-
ment agreements may make such arrangements as may be necessary or
proper to enter into development agreements, including negotiating and
drafting individual development agreements; provided that the county has
adopted an ordinance pursuant to section 46-123.
The final draft of each individual development agreement shall be pre-
sented to the county legislative body for approval or modification prior to exe-
cution. To be binding on the county, a development agreement must be ap-
proved by the county legislative body and executed by the mayor on behalf of
the county. County legislative approval shall be by resolution adopted by a
majority of the membership of the county legislative body.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-123 to -124 (LexisNexis 2003).
240. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3223 (West 2006) ("Any local government may, by
ordinance, establish procedures and requirements, as provided in as. 163.3220-163.3243,
to consider and enter into a development agreement with any person having a legal or
equitable interest in real property located within its jurisdiction.") (emphasis added).
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2. Approval and Adoption
Although one governmental body may enter into the negotiation
stage of the development agreement, another may be authorized to
approve the final product. In Hawaii, for example, the mayor is the
designated negotiator, with the final agreement presented to the
county legislative body (city council) for approval. 241 If approved, the
city council must then adopt the development agreement by resolu-
tion.242 In California, a development agreement must be approved by
ordinance. 243
A development agreement may also be entered into early in the
planning process.244 In SMART, an association comprised of area resi-
dents contended that a development agreement entered into by San
Luis Obispo County was invalid because the project in contention had
not been approved for actual construction. 245 In rejecting this conten-
tion and holding for the county, the court stated that the development
agreement statute should be liberally construed to permit "local gov-
ernment to make commitments to developers at the time the devel-
oper makes a substantial investment in a project."246
The court found that the agreement entered into by the county
conformed to the statute because, by focusing on the planning state of
the project, the agreement met rather than evaded the purpose of the
statute.247 The county's agreement maximized the public's role in final
development, increased control over the inclusion of public facilities
and benefits, and "permit[ted] the County to monitor the planning of
241. The Hawaii code provides the following for negotiating development agree-
ments:
The mayor or the designated agency appointed to administer develop-
ment agreements may make such arrangements as may be necessary or
proper to enter into development agreements, including negotiating and
drafting individual development agreements; provided that the county has
adopted an ordinance pursuant to section 46-123.
The final draft of each individual development agreement shall be pre-
sented to the county legislative body for approval or modification prior to exe-
cution. To be binding on the county, a development agreement must be ap-
proved by the county legislative body and executed by the mayor on behalf of
the county. County legislative approval shall be by resolution adopted by a
majority of the membership of the county legislative body.
HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-124.
242. Id. § 46-124.
243. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 65867.5 (West Supp. 2007).
244. See Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County,
100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Ct. App. 2000).
245. Id. at 742.
246. Id. at 746.
247. Id. at 745.
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the Project to effectively assure compliance with [its] existing ... land
use regulations."248
3. Conformance to Plans and Other Reviews
Development agreements must often comply with local govern-
ment plans as a condition of enforceability, either by statute or be-
cause of the rubric that the zoning bargained for must accord with
comprehensive plans. The Hawaii249 and California 250 development
agreement statutes both so require. In California, the development
agreement must be consistent "with the general plan and any appli-
cable specific plan."251 A fully negotiated development agreement is a
"project" under the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"),
and as such is subject to environmental review.252 This is true even
when the development agreement is not directly approved by the local
government but is instead submitted to the voters for approval.2
53
If, prior to incorporation of a new city or annexation to an exist-
ing city, a county has entered into a development agreement with the
developer, the development agreement remains valid for the duration
of the agreement, or for "eight years from the effective date of the in-
corporation or annexation, whichever is earlier," or for up to 15 years
upon agreement between the developer and the city.254 This statute
applies to incorporations where the development agreement was ap-
plied for prior to circulation of the incorporation petition and entered
into between the county and the developer prior to the date of the in-
corporation election. 255 The statute also allows the incorporating or
annexing city to modify or suspend the provisions of the development
248. Id.
249. See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-129 (LexisNexis 2003) ("No development
agreement shall be entered into unless the county legislative body finds that the provi-
sions of the proposed development agreement are consistent with the county's general
plan and any applicable development plan, effective as of the effective date of the devel-
opment agreement.").
250. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867.5 (West Supp. 2007) ("(a) A development agree-
ment is a legislative act which shall be approved by ordinance and is subject to referen-
dum. (b) A development agreement shall not be approved unless the legislative body finds
that the provisions of the agreement are consistent with the general plan and any appli-
cable specific plan.").
251. Id. § 65867.5(b).
252. See California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21065
(West 1996); Citizens for Responsible Gov't v. City of Albany, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 102, 111
(Ct. App. 1997) (interpreting "project').
253. Citizens for Responsible Gov't, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111. See generally Califor-
nia Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21178.1 (West 1996).
254. CAL. GOVT CODE § 65865.3(a) (West 1997).
255. Id. § 65865.3(c)(1)-(2).
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agreement if it finds an adverse impact on public health or safety in
the jurisdiction. 256 However, as to annexations, if the proposal for an-
nexation "is initiated by a petitioner other than a city, the develop-
ment agreement is valid unless the city adopts written findings that
implementation of the development agreement would create a condi-
tion injurious to the health, safety, or welfare of city residents."257
The importance of the plan is demonstrated by the Idaho Su-
preme Court in Sprenger, Grubb & Assocs., v. City of Hailey.258 There,
the court upheld a rezoning over the objections of the developers of
property subject to what the court called a development agreement
(arguably an annexation agreement), on the ground that the applica-
ble plan was sufficiently broad in that it supported the contested
downzoning.259 Largely to the same effect is a recent California Court
of Appeals decision where the existence of, and need to conform to,
applicable plans was critical in upholding a development agreement
in the face of a broad and direct challenge to such agreements gener-
ally.260
4. The Legislative/Administrative Issue
One of the thorniest problems in land use regulation is whether
the amendment or changing of such a regulation is legislative or
quasi-judicial/administrative.61 Legislative decisions like zoning
amendments are subject to initiative and referendum, whereas quasi-
judicial decisions like the granting of a special use permit, are not in
many jurisdictions. Legislative decisions like rezonings are, when ap-
pealed, usually heard de novo whereas quasi-judicial decisions, like
the granting of a special use permit, are decided on the record made
before the permitting agency, usually under a state's administrative
256. Id. § 65865.3(b).
257. Id. § 65865.3(cX3).
258. 127 Idaho 576, 903 P.2d 741 (1995).
259. Id. at 585, 903 P.2d at 750 ("The Council's conclusion that the 'downzoning'
•.. is consistent with Haley's comprehensive plan is not clearly erroneous, and is af-
firmed.").
260. See Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County,
100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Ct. App. 2000).
261. See, e.g., Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 524 P.2d 84, 90-91 (Haw. 1974) (hold-
ing a reclassification of land by a state land use commission to be quasi-judicial); Fasano
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973) (holding a rezoning to be the same,
despite the general rule that such "rezonings" are generally held to be legislative in char-
acter).
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procedure code. 262 What about the development agreement? On this
issue, California and Hawaii appear to differ-in the former, it is a
legislative act, 26 3 whereas it is an administrative act in the latter.26
4
As with zoning, what follows from the statutory declarations-
legislative in California, "quasi-judicial/administrative" in Hawaii-is
more than a matter of form. Legislative decisions are subject to refer-
endum.26 5 Quasi-judicial ones may not be.266 Given the common use of
the referendum in both California and Hawaii 267 to address land use
issues, development agreements in Hawaii, at least, are likely to be
"referendum-proof," as well as protected against government change,
during the life of a development agreement. However, California lim-
its the opportunity to repeal a development agreement to thirty days
from the date the local government approved the agreement. 26 There-
after, both the agreement and the proposed land development are
immune from subsequent changes by referendum. 269 Moreover, in
Midway Orchards, a California court held a development agreement
was invalid because the general plan amendment relied on for consis-
tency was timely subject to a referendum.270 The court stated:
262. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW §§ 5.31, 5.33, 5.38 (1998); see also David L. Callies, Nancy
C. Neuffer & Carlito P. Caliboso, Ballot Box Zoning: Initiative, Referendum and the Law,
39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 53 (1991).
263. See Santa Margarita Area Residents Together, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 744.
264. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-131 (LexisNexis 2003) ("Each development
agreement shall be deemed an administrative act of the government body made party to
the agreement.").
265. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867.5 (West Supp. 2007) ("A development agree-
ment is a legislative act.., and is subject to referendum.").
266. See DAVID L. CALLIES & ROBERT H. FREILICH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LAND USE 309 (1986); DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 3.12 (2d ed. 1986). But see City of
Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 199 (2003).
267. Land use initiatives, on the other hand, are illegal in Hawaii, largely on the
ground that they are anti-planning. See Sandy Beach Def. Fund v. City Council of Hono-
lulu, 773 P.2d 250 (Haw. 1989).
268. See Midway Orchards v. County of Butte, 269 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804-06 (Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that where development agreements are approved by legislative act
of resolution that do not include referendum mechanism, the constitutional right to refer-
endum requires a thirty-day delay in effectiveness of the agreement to allow for referen-
dum procedure).
269. See DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR., CURTIN'S CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING
LAW 189 (17th ed. 1997) ("A development agreement is... subject to repeal by referen-
dum. However, the opportunity for such repeal expires 30 days after the city's adoption
of... the agreement, and thereafter the project is immune to subsequent changes in zon-
ing ordinances and land use regulations... inconsistent with those... in the agree-
ment.").
270. 269 Cal. Rptr. 769.
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The development agreement was therefore unlawfully ap-
proved and executed. A contract entered into by a local gov-
ernment without legal authority is "wholly void," ultra vires,
and unenforceable. Such a "contract" can create no vested
rights. Therefore, Midway can claim no right to develop its
property based on a development agreement void from the be-
ginning.271
Since a development agreement is a legislative act, a local govern-
ment's decision not to enter into a development agreement need not
be supported by findings. 272
Under the California development agreement statute, mutuality
of consideration is not required. 273 As a practical matter, however, it is
usually present as the developer obtains a "freeze" on applicable land
use regulations while the public often obtains increased control over
the development, certain assurances that the project will go forward,
and perhaps other concessions from the developer that could not be
obtained through the standard land use exaction process.
Finally, there is the question in California of whether the legisla-
ture can declare something to be a legislative act if it is not one any-
way, even though this might "take away a right reserved in the Cali-
fornia Constitution to the people of a city to rezone by initiative."274 A
California appellate court has declared that a development agreement
is a legislative act. 275 This issue does not arise in Hawaii, both because
the state constitution does not so provide, and because the Hawaii
statute expresses a preference against such agreements being legisla-
tive acts.2 7 6 Other states have decided the question in the courts
alone. 277
271. Id. at 807 (citations omitted); see also 216 Sutter Bay Assocs. v. County of
Sutter, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that an interim urgency zoning ordi-
nance and a parallel "ordinary" urgency ordinance, adopted by a newly elected board of
supervisors within the 30-day "referendum period," successfully stopped a development
agreement adopted by the preceding, lame-duck board).
272. Native Sun/Lyon Comtys. v. City of Escondido, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 355
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
273. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65867 (West 1997).
274. Donald G. Hagman, Development Agreements, 3 ZONING AND PLAN. L. REP.
65(1980).
275. Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County, 100
Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 744 (Ct. App. 2000).
276. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-131 (LexisNexis 2003).
277. See, e.g., Geralnes B.V. v. City of Greenwood Vill., 583 F. Supp. 830, 835 (D.
Colo. 1984) (holding that city's zoning actions are quasi-judicial).
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5. Public Hearing
Another issue that arises frequently is whether a public hearing
is required before a development agreement can be entered into, and,
if so, what proceedings are required. Both Hawaii 278 and California279
explicitly require that a public hearing be held prior to adoption of the
development agreement.
6. Binding of State and Federal Agencies
Hawaii and California diverge on another key point-the binding
inclusion of state or federal agencies. Hawaii seeks to bind them;28 0
California does not.28 1 California initially appears to limit agreements
to cities and counties, though it contemplates coastal commissions as
parties under certain circumstances. 28 2 Hawaii, on the other hand,
278. See HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-128 ("No development agreement shall be en-
tered into unless a public hearing on the application therefor first shall have been held by
the county legislative body.").
279. The California code provides:
A public hearing on an application for a development agreement shall be
held by the planning agency and by the legislative body. Notice of intention to
consider adoption of a development agreement shall be given as provided in
Section 65090 and 65091 in addition to any other notice required by law for
other actions to be considered concurrently with the development agreement.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867 (West 1997).
280. The Hawaii code provides:
In addition to the county and principal, any federal, state, or local gov-
ernment agency or body may be included as a party to the development
agreement. If more than one government body is made party to an agree-
ment, the agreement shall specify which agency shall be responsible for the
overall administration of the agreement.
HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-126(d).
281. The California code provides:
A development agreement shall not be applicable to any development
project located in an area for which a local coastal program is required to be
prepared and certified pursuant to the requirements of Division 20 (com-
mencing with Section 30000) of the Public Resources Code, unless: (1) the re-
quired local coastal program has been certified as required by such provisions
prior to the date on which the development agreement is entered into, or
(2) in the event that the required local coastal program has not been certified,
the California Coastal Commission approves such development agreement by
formal commission action.
CAL. Govr CODE § 65869.
282. See id.
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appears determined to permit state and federal agencies in develop-
ment agreements. 28
7. Amendment or Cancellation of the Agreement
Generally, mutual consent of both parties is needed to amend or
cancel the agreement. 284 In Hawaii, if the proposed amendment would
substantially alter the original agreement, a public hearing must be
held.285 In California, a local government may terminate or modify a
development agreement if it "finds and determines, on the basis of
substantial evidence, that the applicant or successor in interest
thereto has not complied in good faith with terms or conditions."28
8. Breach
There are essentially two kinds of breaches that commonly occur
during the period of an agreement: change in land use rules by local
government and failure to provide a bargained-for facility, dedication,
or hook-up by either party.
a. When Local Government Changes the Land Development Rules
Recall that the overriding concern of the landowner in negotiat-
ing a development agreement is the vesting of development rights or
the freezing of land development regulations during the term of the
agreement. Whether these regulations are changed just prior to the
execution of the agreement, and whether the landowner may need
further permits which are not subject to a particular agreement, raise
different, but related, questions. Here, we deal only with the effect on
the landowner and the agreement should the local government change
development regulations during term of the agreement. Development
agreement statutes usually contemplate such a freeze. 287
283. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-126(d).
284. See CAL. Gov~r CODE § 65868 ("A development agreement may be amended,
or canceled in whole or in part, by mutual consent of the parties to the agreement or their
successors in interest."); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-130 ("A development agreement may
be amended or canceled, in whole or in part, by mutual consent of the parties to the
agreement, or their successors in interest .... ).
285. See HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-130 ("[If the county determines that a pro-
posed amendment would substantially alter the original development agreement, a public
hearing on the amendment shall be held by the county legislative body before it consents
to the proposed amendment.").
286. CAL. GovT CODE § 65865.1.
287. For example, the California code provides:
[Vol. 43
2007] PROVIDING INFRASTRUCTURE FOR SMART 401
GROWTH: LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS
Thus, the California Supreme Court, in City of West Hollywood v.
Beverly Towers, made it abundantly clear in a footnote that land-
owner protection from development regulation changes is a major fac-
tor in executing development agreements:
[Dlevelopment agreements... between a developer and a lo-
cal government limit the power of that government to apply
newly enacted ordinances to ongoing developments. Unless
otherwise provided in the agreement, the rules, regulations,
and official policies governing permitted uses, density, design,
improvement, and construction are those in effect when the
agreement is executed.288
The purpose of a development agreement, said the court, was "to
allow a developer who needs additional discretionary approvals to
complete a long-term development project as approved, regardless of
any intervening changes in local regulations."289
The few courts that have dealt with local government changes in
land use regulations have no difficulty in finding them inapplicable to
the property subject to the agreement, provided the agreement itself
is binding. Thus, in Meegan v. Village of Tinley Park, the Illinois Su-
preme Court held that the original zoning of the subject property was
valid during the term of the annexation agreement and any change by
the Village was void during that time.290 Indeed, since the Village's at-
Unless otherwise provided by the development agreement, rules, regula-
tions, and official policies governing permitted uses of the land, governing
density, and governing design, improvement, and construction standards and
specifications, applicable to development of the property subject to a devel-
opment agreement, shall be those rules, regulations, and official policies in
force at the time of execution of the agreement. A development agreement
shall not prevent a city, county, or city and county, in subsequent actions ap-
plicable to the property, from applying new rules, regulations, and policies
which do not conflict with those rules, regulations, and policies applicable to
the property as set forth herein, nor shall a development agreement prevent
a city, county, or city and county from denying or conditionally approving any
subsequent development project application on the basis of such existing or
new rules, regulations, and policies.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65866.
288. 805 P.2d 329, 334 n.6 (Cal. 1991); see also Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Protecting
Developers' Permits to Build: Development Agreement in Practice in California and Other
States, 18 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 85, 85-92 (1995) (discussing various tests for determin-
ing when a developer's rights have vested and local government is estopped "from enact-
ing or applying subsequent zoning changes to prevent the completion of the project or
substantially reduce the return upon the developer's investment").
289. Beverly Towers, 805 P.2d at 334-35.
290. 288 N.E.2d 423, 426 (Ill. 1972).
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tempted zoning change was void, said the Court, there was effectively
no breach by the Village. 291
On the other hand, careful drafting is necessary to avoid the later
application of land development regulations of a different sort than
those contemplated in the agreement. Thus, in the California case of
Pardee Construction Co. v. City of Camarillo, the court held that, ac-
cording to the agreement between Pardee and the city, Pardee had the
right to develop according to the city's "masterplan"; and because any
changes to the "masterplan" affected all developers in the city, the
changes in the ordinance were applicable to Pardee.292 While this
seems to require a certain amount of prescience from the landowner
at first blush, a local government can hardly be estopped from exercis-
ing its police power in enforcing a new breed of land development
regulations that were not contemplated years before by either party,
under the exercise of its police power. Country Meadows West Part-
nership v. Village of Germantown represents an entirely different per-
spective. The court struck down the Village's imposition of a new im-
pact fee against a subdivider, holding that because of the subdivision
agreement between the Village and the subdivider "the Village
[could]not... demand additional impact fees at the time Country
Meadows applies for a building permit."293
Most development agreement statutes either contain a limitation
on the duration of such agreements, 294 or provide that the agreement
must recite one. 295
b. Nonperformance of a Bargained-for Act: Dedications,
Contributions, and Hook-ups
Equally common is the failure of a landowner or local govern-
ment to live up to the other terms of the agreement, generally by fail-
291. See id.; cf Cummings v. City of Waterloo, 683 N.E.2d 1222, 1230 (IlM. App.
Ct. 1997) (holding the city's amendment to its zoning ordinance that was contrary to the
provisions of an annexation agreement unenforceable against property subject to the an-
nexation agreement).
292. 690 P.2d 701, 705-06 (Cal. 1984).
293. 2000 WI App 127, [ 20-21, 614 N.W.2d 498, 503 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
294. See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-15.1-1 (West 2005) ("The agreement
shall be valid and binding for a period of not to exceed 20 years from the date of its execu-
tion."); id. 5/11-15.1-5 ("Any annexation agreement executed prior to October 1, 1973 ...
is hereby declared valid and enforceable as to such provisions for the effective period of
such agreement, or for 20 years from the date of execution thereof, whichever is
shorter.").
295. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65865.2 (West 1997) ("A development agreement
shall specify the duration of the agreement...."); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-126(a)(4)
(LexisNexis 2003) ("A development agreement shall... [pirovide a termination
date.. ").
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ing to provide a public facility or money therefor, or by refusing to
provide utility services to the subject property. 296 Under such circum-
stances, the courts have been strict in forcing the parties to live up to
their bargains, even when unusual difficulties would appear to render
such performance nearly impossible. Thus, in the California case of
Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, the court of appeals di-
rected the local government to provide sewer connections to the land-
owner's property, as agreed in an annexation agreement, even though
a superior governmental entity, a state regional water quality control
board, ordered the local government not to do so. 297 After deciding
that the agreement did not amount to the city's illegally contracting
away its police power, the court stated: "The onset of materially
changed conditions is not a ground for voiding a municipal contract
which was valid when made, nor is the contracting city's failure to
have foreseen them."298
E. Limits on Local Government Conditions, Exactions, and
Dedications Pursuant to Development Agreements
While every governmental action must be invested with a public
purpose, there are few conditions, exactions, or dedications that a lo-
cal government may not legitimately bargain for in negotiating such
agreements. Certainly, local governments may require landowners
and developers to make reasonable contributions toward whatever
services and other resources the government will need to provide as a
result of an annexation or development.299 But this is so under exist-
ing law on development conditions and exactions entirely apart from
296. For other items bargained for and litigated, see People ex rel. Van Cleave v.
Village of Seneca, 519 N.E.2d 63, 64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (exemptions from real estate
taxes), and People ex rel. O'Malley v. Village of Ford Heights, 633 N.E.2d 848, 849 (I.
App. Ct. 1994) (exemption from environmental ordinances, which did not survive legal
challenge).
297. 130 Cal. Rptr. 196, 200, 203-04 (Ct. App. 1976). But cf Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492, 506 (1987) (upholding governmental re-
fusal to perform a development agreement when health and safety issue is involved);
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,593-94 (1962).
298. Morrison Homes Corp., 130 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
299. See, e.g., Vill. of Orland Park v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 481 N.E.2d
946, 950 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) ("Additional positive effects of such agreements include con-
trols over health, sanitation, fire prevention and police protection, which are vital to gov-
erning communities.").
IDAHO LAW REVIEW
such agreements.30 0 The question is whether the local government
may go further since the development agreement is in theory a volun-
tary agreement which neither government nor landowner is com-
pelled to either negotiate or execute. So long as the agreement is in
fact voluntary, the answer is almost certainly yes.301
Whether or not development agreements successfully avoid or
survive nexus and proportionality challenges may depend, however,
upon how willing the courts are to accept the underlying "voluntary"
rationale.
The argument has been made that exactions agreed to under a
voluntary development agreement must bear a rational nexus to the
needs created by the development. 302 The argument states that the
"rational nexus" and "substantial advancement" standards of Nollan
are not limited to just those instances where the municipality requires
an exaction from an -uncooperative landowner, but also apply to vol-
untary permit conditions. Under this view, the type and extent of ex-
actions permissible under development agreements would not differ
from the type and extent available under other traditional exaction
mechanisms such as impact fees.
The rationale supporting such a view is that requiring the Nollan
standard to be satisfied serves to prevent governmental abuse of the
mechanism, as it is "difficult to tell whether a landowner's acceptance
300. See Callies, supra note 132; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
391 (1994) (holding that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that "the
city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development"); Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987) ("We have long recognized that land-
use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state in-
terests' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.'... [A] broad
range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements.") (internal
citations omitted).
301. See City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 745 A.2d 1000, 1025 (Md. 2000) (holding
that conditions agreed to by the subdivider as part of an earlier subdivision agreement
were not an unconstitutional taking of the subdivider's property). For a contrary view,
which would impose the same strict nexus and proportionality requirements upon such
agreements as upon "freestanding" local government development dedications, exactions,
and other conditions, see generally Sam D. Starritt & John H. McClanahan, Comment,
Land-use Planning and Takings: The Viability of Conditional Exactions to Conserve Open
Space in the Rocky Mountain West After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), 30
LAND & WATER L. REv. 415 (1995).
302. See Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements After Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 22 URB. LAW. 23, 27 (1990) ("In applying this
standard, courts considered... the cost of existing public facilities and their manner of fi-
nancing, the extent to which existing development has already contributed to the cost of
these facilities, and the extent to which the proposed project will contribute to the cost of
the existing facilities in the future.").
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of a condition is truly voluntary or is instead a submission to govern-
ment coercion."30 3 Thus:
A municipality could use ... regulations to exact land or fees
from a subdivider far out of proportion to the needs created by
his subdivision in order to avoid imposing the burden of pay-
ing for additional services on all citizens via taxation. To tol-
erate this situation would be to allow an otherwise acceptable
exercise of police power to become grand theft.304
The Hawaii development agreement statue provides that, "Public
benefits derived from development agreements may include, but are
not limited to, affordable housing, design standards, and on- and off-
site infrastructure and other improvements. Such benefits may be ne-
gotiated for in return for the vesting of development rights for a spe-
cific period."305 According to one commentator:
[Tihe government can require the developer to provide public
benefits unrelated to the proposed project in exchange for the
municipality granting her the right to develop .... [T]he stat-
ute leads municipalities to believe that the granting of devel-
opment rights confers a governmental benefit on the devel-
oper. This is not the case. Nollan clearly holds that "the right
to build on one's own property--even though its exercise can
be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements-cannot
remotely be described as a "'governmental benefit." 306
However, while it is true that the right to develop on one's own
land is not a governmental benefit, the right to develop is not the bar-
gaining chip that is tendered by the government in a development
agreement. The authorities cited in support of the above-quoted ar-
gument concern exactions imposed as required conditions to develop-
ment.30 7 In the case of a development agreement, the municipality is
not granting the landowner the right to develop nor imposing condi-
tions on such development, but instead promising to protect the de-
303. Id. at 46.
304. Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976) (upholding a
statute authorizing municipalities to require dedication of land or payment of fees as con-
dition of subdivision approval as constitutional since the enabling legislation and imple-
menting ordinance limited the amount of land to be dedicated to a "reasonable" percent-
age of the property).
305. HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-121 (LexisNexis 2003).
306. Crew, supra note 302, at 49 (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 833 (1987)).
307. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Bowen v. Gilliard,
483 U.S. 587, 605 (1987).
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veloper's investment by not enforcing any subsequent land-use regu-
lation that may burden the project. The developer does not require
any such guarantee to exercise his right or privilege to build, and may
certainly choose to avail himself of such a guarantee and to negotiate
for it. It could be argued that the development agreement does indeed
convey a "governmental benefit" upon the developer, since "[iut is well
established that there is no federal Constitutional right to be free
from changes in land use laws."308 The municipality should therefore
be free to negotiate its best terms in exchange for the benefit con-
ferred, regardless of nexus. Because development agreements are
adopted as a result of negotiations between a local government and a
developer, they are not subject to the Dolan or Nollan decisions. 30 9
In Hermosa Beach Stop Oil Coalition v. City of Hermosa Beach,310
the court held that the developer, who had failed to establish entitle-
ment to vested rights to develop an oil business on property leased
from the city, could have protected itself from later regulatory
amendments by asking that the city enter into a development agree-
ment.311 The court noted that it was likely that the city would have
demanded additional consideration for either a risk-adjustment provi-
sion in the existing lease or a separate development agreement, and
that "[h]aving at least implicitly decided to forego such protection
against future regulatory change, [the developer] must accept the
consequences of its judgment to do so."312
In another California case, the trial court held that the develop-
ers' rights vested at the time of signing development, and thus the city
could not use wording within the agreement to allow it to raise sewer
connection fees. 313 Developers and the city entered into a 15-year writ-
ten agreement allowing for the development of a residential subdivi-
sion, allowing the city to charge any "new taxes, assessments or de-
velopment impact fees on the implementation of the Project" only if
those same charges are levied on all other similar developments
within the city.31 4 Six years after the parties signed the contract, the
city raised the monthly wastewater connection fees and initial capital
308. Lakeview Dev. Corp. v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1295 (9th
Cir. 1990).
309. See Leroy Land Dev. Corp. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696,
698-99 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding settlement agreement not subject to Nollan); see also
Callies & Tappendorf, supra note 181.
310. 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 447 (Ct. App. 2001).
311. Id. at464.
312. Id.
313. Operating Eng'rs Funds, Inc. v. City of Thousand Oaks, No. B137879, 2002
WL 44253, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2002) (holding that because the plaintiffs did not
succeed in each of its claims, they could not qualify for attorney fees).
314. Id. at*1.
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surcharge for each residential unit during the period covered by the
contract, and the developers sued for breach of contract because their
development rights had vested at the time of the initial agree-
ment. The trial court agreed, but said that plaintiffs could not chal-
lenge the increased costs for potential future homeowners.3 15
In City of North Las Vegas v. Pardee Construction Co. of Nevada,
a developer lost the appeal to define a cost-based fee as an impact fee
in order to invalidate it through the parties' development agreement,
which only prohibited impact fees.3 16 The municipality in that case
regulated water issues on a regional level, and to respond to Nevada's
growth spurt, the region passed a capital improvements plan to sup-
plement the existing, overstrained water supply system.3 17 The city
had to join the regional water authority because its own water supply
did not accommodate for any more growth. Upon joining, the city had
to pay for the connection to the new system through city-wide assess-
ments and water delivery, connection and commodity fees. 318 To meet
these payments, the city passed the costs on to the consumers at a di-
rect rate-not making any profit. 319 Plaintiffs contended that these
new charges were really impact fees and violated the terms of their
development agreement.3 20 Because the city does not make a profit-it
instead bases the charges on those charges it must pay to the regional
authority, with no money going toward capital improvements-the
court found that the charge was simply cost-based and within the pa-
rameters of the development agreement.3 21
Courts regularly label sewer systems as a typical government
function, but consider general water and storm water systems to be
proprietary. Thus, in balance, a development agreement often pro-
vides that the subdivision developer install the water and sewer lines
needed both within the subdivision and to connect the subdivision to
extant lines. Sometimes the development agreement also requires
payments for upgrades to the city's water facilities to manage the
greater flow requirements of the new development. In return for the
improvements, the city agrees to maintain the pipe infrastructure
within and connected to the subdivision.
315. Id. at *2.
316. 21 P.3d 8 (Nev. 2001).
317. Id. at 8-9.
318. Id. at 9.
319. Id. at 10.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 11.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Land development conditions and development agreements pro-
vide a realistic way for local governments to provide adequate public
facilities and services to its citizens. By requiring developers to shoul-
der a major share of the cost of infrastructure, residential, commer-
cial, and/or industrial growth will not outpace important public ser-
vices like water, sewage, roads, schools, and parks.
Exactions, dedications, in-lieu or impact fees can be used to fund
new infrastructure if local governments follow the necessary judicial
and/or legislative guidelines. First, there must be an essential nexus
between the land development conditions and what the developer
proposes to do with the property.322 Second, there must be at least a
proportionally reasonable relationship between the land development
condition and the need or problem which the development is expected
to cause.3 23 This need or problem must be evidenced by "some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the proposed development's impact."
324
Government must determine the cost of the proposed facilities and the
calculation of fees must be carefully determined in order to avoid a
regulatory taking or unlawfully imposed tax. Many local governments
adopt ordinances to set the rate or schedule of fees or, in the alterna-
tive, the developer is permitted to determine its own fee by demon-
strating that its share is less than the fee set by the ordinance.
325
Boise's recent exercises in growth management strategies326 provide
in some measure for such fees and exactions, as Professor Robert
Freilich reports in his spring growth management symposium re-
marks which will appear in a subsequent edition of the law review.
A validly executed development agreement avoids the require-
ments of both nexus and proportionality because it is consensual,
thereby allowing a local government to exact more from a developer
than it would otherwise be constitutional However, to be valid, a de-
velopment agreement should be drafted in accordance with an ena-
bling statute. Idaho's case law with respect to such agreements is par-
ticularly strict and so statutory authority would be particularly help-
ful.327
322. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987).
323. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390 (1994).
324. Id. at 375.
325. Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach County v. Bd. Of County
Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140, 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
326. See, e.g., PLANNING WORKS, LLC & PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER,
BLUEPRINT FOR GOOD GROWTH: PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION DRAFT May 17, 2006.
327. Sprenger, Grubb & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 903 P.2d
741 (1995).
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